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#####Magistri Petri Lombardi#Arch. Episc. Parisiensis#Master
Peter Lombard#Archbishop of Paris##Sententiarum Quatuor Libri#The Four Books of
Sentences##LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE#THE FIRST BOOK
OF THE SENTENCESON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD##DISTINCTIO VII.#DISTINCTION
7##Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 132-133.#Cum
Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi#Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S.
Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 132-133.#Notes by the Quaracchi
Editors.##Cap. I.Utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit gignere Filium.#Chapter
IWhether the Father could* and/or willed to beget the Son.##Hic solet quaeri a
quibusdam, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit generare Filium. Si enim, inquiunt
potuit etl voluit generare Filium: ergo potuit aliquid et voluit, quod nec
potuit nec voluit Filius; nam Filius nec potuit nec voluit generare Filium. Cui
versutiae facile respondemus dicentes: posse vel velle subiectum2 voluntati vel
potentiae. Est tamen aliqua potentia vel voluntas, scilicet posse vel velle
gignere Filium; et ideo distinguenda est intelligentia propositi verbi: posse
vel velle gignere Filium est3 posse vel velle aliquid. Neque enim generatio
Filii aliquid eorum est, quae subiecta sunt divinae potentiae et voluntati, nec
est aliquid inter omnia vel de omnibus, sed super omnia et ante omnia. Non enim
ante voluit vel potuit, quam genuit; sicut nec ante fuit, quam genuit, quia4 ab
aeterno fuit et ab aeterno genuit. Ex simili quoque hoc videre possumus. Pater
enim potest esse Pater et vult esse Pater; Filius autem nec5 potest nec vult
esse Pater: ergo Pater potest vel vult esse aliquid, quod non potest vel vult
esse Filius. Non sequitur, quia esse Patrem non est esse aliquid, sed est esse
ad aliquid, ut in sequenti ostendetur.6##Here one is accustomed to be asked by
certain (men), whether the Father could and/or willed to generate the Son. For
if, they say, He could [potuit] andl did will to generate the Son: therefore He
could and willed (to do) something, which the Son neither could nor willed (to
do); for the Son neither could nor willed to generate the Son. To which
craftiness [versutiae] we easily respond, saying: that "to be able" [posse]
and/or "to will" (is) subject to the (Divine)2 Will and/or Power [potentiae].
However, it is some power and/or will, namely [scilicet], to be able and/or to
will to beget the Son; and for that reason the understanding of the proposed
word is to be distinguished: "to be able and/or to will to beget the Son" is3
"to be able and/or to will (to do) something". For neither is the generation of
the Son something belonging to those (things), which have been subjected to the
Divine Power and Will, nor is it something among all and/or from all, but rather
over all and before all. For not before He willed and/or could, did He beget;
just as neither before He was, did He beget, because4 from eternity He was and
from eternity He begot. From a similar (reason) we can also see this. For the
Father can be the Father and wills to be the Father; moreover the Son neither5
can nor wills to be the Father: therefore the Father can and/or wills to be
something, which the Son is cannot and/or does not will to be. It does not
follow, that to be the Father is not to be something, but it is to be toward
something, as will be shown in the following.6##Sed vehementer nos movet quod
ait Augustinus in secundo libro contra Maximum,7 qui asserebat Patrem
potentioem Filio, eo quod Filius genuit Deum creatorem, Filius autem non;
dicebatque Patrem potuisse gignere non Filium; et ideo potentioem esse Filio.
Ad quod respondens Augustinus dicere videtur, quod Filius etiam potuit gignere,
volens ostendere, Patrem non esse potentioem Filio, his verbis: Absit, ut
ideo potentior sit Pater Filio, sicut putas, quia Creatorem genuit Pater, Filius
autem non genuit Creatorem; neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. Vide et
diligenter attende haec verba: non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. Videtur
enim dicere, quod Filius potuit gignere, sed non oportuit; et ita potuit quod
non oportuit. Quare autem non oportuit, subdit dicens: Immoderata enim esset
divina generatio, si genitus Filius nepotem gigneret Patri, quia et ipse nepos,
nisi avo suo pronepotem gigneret, secundum vestram mirabilem sapientiam impotens

diceretur. Similiter etiam ille, si nepotem non gigneret avo suo et pronepotem proavo suo, non a vobis appellaretur omnipotens; nec impleretur generationis series, si semper alter ex altero nasceretur; nec eam perficeret ullus, si non sufficeret unus omnipotens. Itaque omnipotentem genuit Filium Patris natura, non fecit ①.##But we are vehemently moved by [nos movet] what (St.) Augustine says in the second book Against Maximinus,7 who used to assert that the Father (is) more powerful [potentio-rem] than the Son, for the reason that He begot the Son (to be) God the Creator, but the Son (did) not; and he used to say that the Father could beget not-the-Son; and for that reason He is more powerful than the Son. To which (St.) Augustine, responding, seems to say, that the Son also could beget, wanting to show, that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, with these words: ② Far be it, that for that reason the Father be more powerful than the Son, as you think, because the Father begot the Creator, but the Son did not beget the Creator; for neither could He not, but rather it was not proper (that He do so) ③. See and diligently attend to these words: for not could He not, but rather it was not proper. For he seems to say, that the Son could beget, but it was not proper (that He beget); and thus He could (do) what was not proper (to do). Moreover why it was not proper, He says below [subdit] saying: ④ For the divine generation would be immoderate, if the Begotten Son would not beget a descendent [nepotem] for the Father, because even a descendent himself, unless he begets a great-grandson for his own grandfather, would be called impotent according to your wonderful wisdom. Similarly also that one, if he did not beget a descendent for his own grandfather and a great-grandson for his own great-grandfather, would not by you be named omnipotent; nor is the series of generation fulfilled, if one of the two is always born out of the other; nor would any thoroughly accomplish [perficeret] this, if one omnipotent was is not sufficient. And thus the Nature of the Father begot, not made, the Son Omnipotent ⑤.##Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam posse stare, scilicet quod Filius potuerit gignere. Si enim Filius potuit8 gignere, potuit esse pater; si potuit esse pater, ergo potuit esse pater vel sui, vel Patris, vel Spiritus san- / -cti, vel alicuius alius.##Moreover this does not seem to certain (men) to be able to stand, that is, that the Son could beget. For if the Son could8 beget, He could be a father; if He could be a father, therefore He could be a father either of Himself, and/or of the Father, and/or of the Holy Spirit /, and/or of anyone else [alicuius alius].###1 Vat. vel, sed contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.#2 Supple cum cod. A divinae.#3 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 et. Paulo ante codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 3, 7 praepositi loco propositi.#4 Edd. 1, 2, 8 addunt et.#5 Vat. cum edd. 4, 6 non.#6 Dist. XXVIII. c. 5. ⑥ Paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem sed est esse ad aliquid, quam edd. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 sic exhibent: sed potest esse ad aliquid.#7 Cap. 12. n. 2. ⑦ Mox Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8 post potentio-rem addit esse. Dein cod. C bene genuerit loco genuit.#8 Edd. 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 poterit. ### [Trans. Note: This question turns about the Latin terms posse, potens, potentia, impotentia, omnipotens, all of which cannot be translated into English with the same cognate. For the sake of utility the following English words will be used, respectively: to be able or forms of the helping verb can, able, power, impotency, omnipotent.]#1 The Vatican text reads and/or [vel], but contrary to the codices and editions 1, 6, and 8.#2 Supply with codex A Divine.#3 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8, reads and [et]. A little before this codices A B C E together with editions 1, 3, and 7 read preposed [praepositi] in place of proposed [propositi].#4 Editions 1, 2, and 8 add even [et].#5 The Vatican text together with editions 4 and 6 reads cannot nor [non potest nec].#6 Distinction XXVIII, ch. 5. ⑧ A little before this codices A B C E and edition 1 omit the proposition but it is to be toward something, which editions 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 exhibit in this manner: but it can be toward something.#7 Chapter 12, n. 2. ⑨ Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the codices and editions 1 and 8, at more powerful [potentio-rem] adds is [esse]. Then codex C well has (the subjunctive) He begot [genuerit] in place of (the indicative) He begot [genuit].#8 Editions 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 have (the subjunctive) could [potuerit]. ###⑩p. 133vel Spiritus san- / -cti, vel alicuius alius. Sed1 alius non, quia nullus alius semper fuit; nec Patris, quia Pater est ingenuitus et innascibilis; sec sui, ⑪ quia nulla res se ipsam gignere potest ⑫;

nec Spiritus sancti, quia nasci non potuit. Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse filius, et ita mutabilis esse potuit. #and/or of anyone else [alicuius alia]. But not (of anyone)1 else, because no other always was; neither of the Father, because the Father is unbegotten and innascible; neither of Himself, 2 because no thing can beget its very self 3; nor of the Holy Spirit, because He could not be born. For if He could be born, He could (also) be a son, and thus He could be mutable. ##Quomodo ergo accipietur2 quod supra dictum est: non enim non potuit gignere, sed non oportuit, quasi potuit, sed non oportuit? Non est nobis perspicuum aperire, quomodo sit hoc verum, et ideo sub silentio potius esse praetereundum, nisi me super hoc aliquid loqui cogeret instantia quaerentium. #Therefore in what manner shall2 what has been said above be accepted: for not (that) He could beget, but it was not proper (that He do so), as if He could, but it was not proper (that He do it)? To uncover, in what manner this may be true, is not clear [perspicuum] to us, and for that reason (it is clear to us) that in silence it must rather be passed by, unless the insistence [instantia] of questioners would drive me to say something on it. ##Potest ergo sic intelligi: non enim non3 potuit, sed non oportuit, id est, non ex impotentia sui fuit, quod Filius non genuit, sed ei non conveniebat, sicut Deus Filius non est Deus Pater; nec tamen hoc ex impotentia sui est. Nam et Pater similiter non est Filius, nec hoc est ex impotentia Patris. Sed quaerit Maximinus, Arianorum Episcopus: unde ergo est, quod Pater non potest esse Filius, vel Filius Pater? Non utique ex impotentia, sed Pater4 proprietate generationis Pater est, qua oportet eum non esse Filium, et Filius proprietate nativitatis Filius est, qua oportet eum non esse Patrem. De quibus proprietatibus postea plenius tractabitur.5 #Therefore it can be thus understood: for not (that) He could not,3, but it was not proper, that is, it was not out of His impotency [impotentia], that the Son did not beget, but it was not fitting for Him, in the same manner [sic] God the Son is not God the Father; nor, however, is this out of His impotency. For even the Father similarly is not the Son, nor is this out of the Father's impotency. But Maximinus, the Bishop of the Arians, asks: whence, therefore, is it, that the Father cannot be the Son, and/or the Son the Father? Certainly not out of impotency, but rather the Father by4 the property of generation is the Father, by which it is proper that He not be the Son, and the Son by the property of nativity is the Son, by which it is proper that He not be the Father. Concerning which properties there will be a fuller treatment [plenius tractabitur] afterwards.5 ##0 Cap. II.0 An posse gignere Filium sit aliqua potentia in Patre, quae non sit in Filio. #0 Chapter II0 Or whether there is some power in the Father that can beget the Son, which is not in the Son. ##Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit natura gignere Filium, et an haec6 sit aliqua potentia, quae sit in Filio. Ad quod dicimus, quod Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia natura est vel essentia. At inquit illi, si potens est gignere, habet ergo potentiam gignendi; Filius autem non habet potentiam gignendi, si non potest gignere: habet ergo Pater aliquam potentiam, quam non habet Filius. Non sequitur. Eandem enim potentiam penitus habet Filius quam et Pater, qua Pater potuit gignere, et Filius potuit gigni. Eadem enim potentia est in Filio, qua potuit gigni, quae est in Patre, qua potuit gignere. Sed contra hoc opponitur: aliud est posse gignere, aliud est posse gigni; quia aliud est gignere,7 aliud gigni. Hic distinguendum est. Si enim, cum dicitur: aliud est posse gignere, aliud posse gigni, aliam significes8 potentiam, qua Pater potens est gignere, et aliam, qua Filius potens est gigni, falsus est intellectus. Si autem dicas, Patrem posse habere aliam proprietatem sive notionem, qua genitor est; et Filium aliam, qua genitus est, verus est intellectus. Aliam enim habet Pater proprietatem, qua Pater est, aliam Filius, qua Filius est. #Likewise it is asked by certain (men), if the Father is by nature able [potens] to beget the Son, and whether this6 is some power, which is in the Son. To which we say, that the Father is not able except by nature; for His power is by nature and/or essence. But they say, if He is able to beget, therefore He has a power to beget; moreover the Son does not have a power to beget, if He cannot beget: therefore the Father has some power, which the Son does not have. (But this is a) non sequitur. For the Son thoroughly has the same power which the Father also (has), by which the Father could beget, and the Son could be begotten. For the same power is in the Son, by

which He could be begotten, which is in the Father, by which He could beget. But against this there is objected: one is to be able to beget, an other is to be able to be begotten; because it is one (thing) to beget,⁷ an other to be begotten. Here there must be a distinction [distinguendum est]. For if, when there is said: "it is one (thing) to be able to beget, an other to be able to be begotten," you signify⁸ the one power, by which the Father is able to beget, and the other, by which the Son is able to be begotten, (then) there is a false understanding. But if you say, "that the Father can have one property or notion, by which He is the Begetter; and the Son an other, by which He is the Begotten," there is a true understanding. For the Father has one property, by which He is the Father, the Son an other, by which He is the Son.##Ita etiam, cum dicitur: Filius non habet potentiam generandi, quam habet Pater, dupliciter intelligi potest. Si enim dicatur: Filius non habet potentiam generandi quam et Pater, id est,⁹ qua potens sit ad generandum, id est, ut genuerit, vel ut generet sicut Pater, verum est. Si vero intelligatur sic: non habet potentiam, qua possit gigni vel genitus esse, qua eadem Pater potens est, ut genuerit vel ut generet, falsum est; sicut dicitur: Pater habet potentiam, qua potest esse Pater; Filius vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Pater; et e converso, Filius habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius, Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius:¹⁰ habet ergo aliquam Pater, quam non habet Filius, et e converso. Absit; quia eadem est potentia Patris, qua potest esse Pater, et Filii, qua potest esse Filius. Ita etiam eadem est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater, non Filius, et Filius vult esse Filius, non Pater: et eadem est voluntas Filii, qua vult esse genitus, et Patrem genuisse; et Patris, qua vult esse genitor, et Filium genitum esse.¹¹Thus also, when there is said: "the Son does not have the power to generate, which the Father has," it can be understood in a twofold manner. For if there be said: "the Son does not have the power to generate which the Father also (has), that is,⁹ by which He is able regarding the thing to be generated, that is, to generate, and/or to have generated as the Father (does)," it is true. However if it be understood thus: "He does not have the power, by which He can be begotten and/or have been begotten, by which same (power) the Father is able, to generate and/or to have generated," it is false; just as there is said: "the Father has a power, by which He can be the Father; however the Son does not have a power, by which He can be the Father" and conversely, "the Son has a power, by which He can be the Son, however the Father does not have a power, by which He can be the Son:¹⁰ therefore the Father has some (power), which the Son does not have" and conversely. Far be it; because the same is the power of the Father, by which He can be the Father, and of the Son, by which He can be the Son. Thus also the same is the Will, by which the Father wills to be the Father, not the Son, and the Son wills to be the Son, not the Father: and the same is the Will of the Son, by which He wills to be begotten, and that the Father to have begotten; and of the Father, by which He wills to be the Begetter, and that the Son has been the Begotten.¹¹###1 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 hic repetit alicuius.#2 Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6 accipiatur.#3 Mendum Vat. omittentis non castigatur ex codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. Paulo ante cod. D Potest autem loco Potest ergo.#4 Codd. hic repetunt ex.#5 Dist. XXVI.#6 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 hoc. Mox pot quae fide codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 expunximus in Vat. additum non. Paulo infra post dicimus quod codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt Pater.#7 Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 9, 10 addit et.#8 Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 significas. Paulo supra post posse gignere codd. A D E addunt et.#9 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 scilicet.#10 Vat. cum ed. 4 indebite omittit Pater vero non habet potetiam, qua possit esse Filius.#11 In codd. B D E et ed. 1 deest esse. ##1 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, here repeats of anyone [alicuius].#2 The Vatican text together with editions 4, 5 and 6, reads is . . . accepted [accipiatur].#3 The fault of the Vatican text of omitting not [non] is corrected from the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. A little before this codex D has Moreover it can [Potest autem] in place of Therefore it can [Potest ergo].#4 The codices here have out of [ex] 5 Distinction XXVI.#6 The Vatican text, contrary to editions 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10 has this (thing) [hoc]. Then after which [quae], trusting in the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8, we have expunged the added not [non] of the Vatican

text. A little below this after we say, that [dicimus, quod] the codices and editions 1 and 8 omit the Father [Pater].#7 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the codices and editions 1, 2, 9, and 10, adds and [et].#8 The Vatican text together with editions 4, 6, and 8, has the indicative you signify [significas]. A little above this after to be able to beget [posse gignere] codices A D and E add and [et].#9 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, and 8, has that is [scilicet].#10 The Vatican text together with edition 4 unduly omits however the Father does not have a power, by which He can be the Son.#11 In codices B D E and edition 1 there is lacking has [esse]. #####The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round () brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae
Bagnoregis#S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae#atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis#St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio#Cardinal Bishop of Alba#& Doctor of the Church##Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum#Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences##Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis#of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris##PRIMI LIBRI#BOOK ONE##COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.#COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII##De comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam.#On the comparison of the power of generating to the Person.##0 ARTICULUS UNICUS.0Quaestio I.#0 ARTICLE SOLE0Question 1##0Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 133-138.#Cum Notitiis Originalibus0#0Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 133-138.#Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.0##0 Hic solet quaeri, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit etc.#0 Here one is accustomed to be asked, whether the Father could and/or willed etc..##DIVISIO TEXTUS.#DIVISION OF THE TEXT##In praesenti distinctione ponit Magister dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, utrum scilicet, sicut est in persona Patris, ita sit in persona Filii. Et habet haec pars duas: in prima Magister quaerit et determinat, utrum Filius possit generare; in secunda, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, ibi: Item, quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit etc.#In the present distinction Master (Peter) posits a doubt from the comparison of the power of generating to the Person, whether namely [scilicet], just as in the Person of the Father, it be thus in the Person of the Son. And this part has two (parts): in the first Master (Peter) asks and determines, whether the Son can generate; in the second, whether the power of generating be in the Son, there (where he says): Likewise, it is asked by certain (men) if the Father is by nature able etc..##Item prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima movet quaestionem, utrum posse et velle / generare similiter comparentur ad personam Patris et Filii.#Likewise the first part has four smaller parts. In the first (of these) he brings forward [movet] a question, whether to be able and to will / to generate are similarly compared to the Person of the Father and the Son.###p. 134generare similiter comparentur ad personam Patris et Filii. Secundo, opponit contra solutionem per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: Sed vehementer nos movet, quod Augustinus etc. Tertio, opponit contra praedictam auctoritatem per rationem, ibi: Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam. Quarto, reddit supra auctoritatem, exponens ipsam,1 ibi: Quomodo ergo accipitur quod supra dictum est.#to generate are similarly compared to the Person of the Father and the Son. Second, he objects [opponit] against the solution through the authority of (St.) Augustine, there (where he says): But we are vehemently moved by what (St.) Augustine etc.. Third, he objects against the aforesaid authority by means of [per] reason, there (where he says): Moreover this does not seem to certain (men). Fourth, he returns to the above authority, expounding it,1 there (where he says): Therefore in what manner is what has been said above to be accepted.##Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est2 secunda pars huius distinctionis, in qua quaerit Magister, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, et haec pars habet duas particulas. Primo, quaerit et determinat hanc

quaestionem, utrum aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio. Si enim Pater natura potens est generare Filium, et Filius non, patet etc. Et³ ad hanc quaestionem respondet Magister, quod omnino eadem est potentia in Patre et Filio. Sed quia hoc erat dubium, ideo opponit contra praedictam solutionem et determinat per distinctionem. Secundo, respondet ad primam quaestionem distinguendo, utrum scilicet Filius habeat potentiam generandi, ibi: Ita etiam cum dicitur, Filius non habet etc. Si enim intelligatur active, falsus est intellectus, scilicet quod Filius possit generare. Si vero intelligatur⁴ passive, scilicet quod habeat potentiam, qua possit generari, vera est. Et fundatur ista distinctio secundum aliquos super hoc, quod id generandi potest intelligi in significatione passiva, vel activa. Si in passiva, tunc vera est; et est sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est potentiam, qua generatur. Si⁵ in activa, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia potest esse gerundium verbi personalis, et tunc habet suppositum determinatum et est falsa; est enim sensus: Filius habet etc. id est, Filius habet potentiam, qua ipse Filius generat; vel impersonalis; et tunc non habet certum suppositum et est locutio vera; est enim sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est, habet potentiam, qua aliquis generat,⁶ tamen hunc sensum non ponit Magister. #Likewise it is asked by certain (men) if the Father etc.. This is² the second part of this distinction, in which Master (Peter) asks, whether the power of generating be in the Son, and this part has two smaller parts. First, he asks and determines this question, whether some power be in the Father, which is not in the Son. For if the Father by nature is able to generate the Son, and the Son not, it is clear etc.. And³ to this question Master (Peter) responds, that entirely the same is the power in the Father and the Son. But because there was doubt on this, for that reason he objected against the aforesaid solution and determined (it) through distinction. Second, he responds to the first question by distinguishing, whether, that is, the Son has a power of generating, there (where he says): Thus also when there is said, "the Son does not have" etc. For if it be understood actively, the understanding is false, that is, that the Son can generate. However if it be understood⁴ passively, that is, that He has a power, by which he can be generated, it is true. And that distinction of his is founded according to some upon this, that the Latin for of generating [generandi] can be understood in a passive signification, and/or as an active one. If in the passive, then it is true; and the sense is: ⁰The Son has the power of being generated⁰, that is ⁰a power, by which He is generated⁰. If⁵ in the active, this can be in a twofold manner, because it can be a gerund for a personal verb, and then it has a determinate subject [suppositum determinatum] and it is false; for the sense is: ⁰the Son has⁰ etc., that is, ⁰the Son has a power, by which the Son Himself generates⁰; and/or (for) a impersonal (verb); and then it does not have a certain subject [certum suppositum] and the saying is true; for the sense is: ⁰the Son has a power of generating⁰, that is, ⁰He has a power, by which someone generates⁰,⁶ however Master (Peter) does not posit this sense. ##⁰ TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. ##⁰ TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS ## Ad evidentiam eorum quae dicit Magister de potentia generandi, quatuor quaeruntur. #For a clear understanding [ad evidentiam] of those thing which Master (Peter) says concerning the power of generating, four (things) are asked. ##Primo quaeritur, utrum posse generare in divinis dicat quid, vel ad aliquid. #First there is asked, whether among divine (things) "to be able to generate" means a what [quid], and/or a toward something [ad aliquid]. ##Secundo, utrum Pater communicet Filio⁷ potentiam generandi, id est, utrum in Filio sit potentia generandi. #Second, whether the Father communicates to the Son⁷ a power of generating, that is, whether in the Son there is a power of generating. ##Tertio, utrum posse generare et creare sit unicum posse, vel non. #Third, whether "to be able to generate and to create" is a unique "to be able", and/or (whether is) not. ##Quarto, utrum posse generari et creari sit posse univocum.⁸ #Fourth, whether "to be able to be generated and to be created" is an univocal "to be able". ##⁰ Quaestio I. ⁰Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum, vel relativum. ## Question 1 ⁰Whether a "power of generation" means something absolute, and/or relative. ## CIRCA PRIMUM, quod posse generare dicit quid, ostenditur: #ABOUT THE FIRST, that "to be able to generate" means a what, is shown: ##1. Primo per auctoritatem Magistri in littera: ⁹ ⁰ Pater non est

potens nisi natura, eiusque potentia natura est vel essentia ①; sed natura et potentia dicunt quid, non ad aliquid: ergo et potentia generandi.#1. First through the authority of Master (Peter) in the text:9 ① The Father is not able except by nature, and His power is by nature and/or essence ①; but nature and power mean a what, not a toward something: therefore also a power of generating.##2. Item ratione ostenditur sic: generare est sibi simile in natura producere; sed secundum Philosophum10 ① natura est vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans ①: ergo vis generandi respicit ipsam naturam sive essentiam de se, non personam; sed omne tale dicit quid: ergo etc.#2. Likewise by reason it is thus shown: to generate is to produce a similar in nature to itself; but according to the Philosopher10 ① nature is a force engrafted into things procreating similars out of similars ①; therefore a force of generating respects the nature itself or the essence of itself [de se], not the person; but every such (term) means a what: ergo etc..##3. Item, ① in perpetuis non differt esse et posse ①: ergo multo fortius in aeternis; ergo idem / est esse et posse, . . .#3. Likewise, ① in perpetuums to be and to be able do not differ ①: therefore much more strongly in eternals; therefore the same / is ①to be① and ①to be able①, . . .###1 Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ipsam.#2 Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1, omittendo verba: Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est, mutat constructionem, quia postea eliminat verba et haec pars. Mox codd. cum ed. 1 tres loco duas, sed falso.#3 Ex mss. X Y bb et ed. 1 adiecimus Et, pro quo plurimi codd. non ita bene Sed; cod. Q vero Secundo et paulo infra tertio pro secundo, at falso, uti inspicienti textum Magistri et verba Bonaventurae patet.#4 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus intelligatur pro intelligitur et mox habeat loco havet et paulo infra ista pro illa ac aliquos loco alios.#5 Vat. Sed, et paulo post omittit hoc contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1, qui et pro gerundium ponunt gerundivum.#6 Cod. O glossando addit: scilicet Pater, quia eadem est potentia in Patre et in Filio ad hoc ut generetur, nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod Filius generat, sed ex hoc sequitur, quod aliquis generat.#7 Ope mss. et ed. 1 restituimus omissum Filio.#8 Mendum Vat. fide mss. correximus substituendo univocum pro unicum.#9 Cap. 2. in initio. ① Mox Vat. contra multos codd. ut A G H I S T V Y Z bb ff et ed. 1 quia eius pro eiusque et in propositione minore contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 et essentia loco et potentia.#10 Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 10. ait: Omnis natura eius est essentiae procreatrix, qualis ipsa est. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.). ① Vat. (cui consentit Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.) contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 ponit Isaac (in eius libro de definitionibus haec non inveniuntur) pro Philosophus. ① B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. et S. p. I. q. 30. m. 1. hanc definitionem attribuit Boethio, editores autem operum Henrici Ganda. Grammatico. Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 42. dicit: Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit.##1 From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied it [ipsam].#2 The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, by omitting the words: Likewise there is asked by certain (men), if the Father etc.. This is changes the construction, because it afterwards eliminates the words and this part. Then the codices together with edition 1 have three [tres] in place of two [duas], but falsely.#3 From manuscripts X Y bb and edition 1 we have added And [Et], in place of which very many codices have not so well But [Sed]; codex Q, however, has Second [Secundo] and a little below this third [tertio] in place of second [secundo], but falsely, as is clear to the one inspecting the text of Master (Peter) and the words of (St.) Bonaventure.#4 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the subjunctive is understood [intelligatur] for the indicative is understood [intelligitur] and then He has [habeat] for He has [habet] and a little below this that . . . of his [ista] in place of that [illa] and some [aliquos] in place of others [alios].#5 The Vatican text reads But [Sed], and a little after this it omits this [hoc], contrary to the older codices and edition 1, which also put gerundive [gerundivum] in place of gerund [gerundium].#6 Codex O by glossing adds: that is the Father, because the same power is in the Father and in the Son for this that He be generated, nor, however, does it follow from this, that the Son generates, but it follows from this, that someone

generates.#7 With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the omitted to the Son [Filio].#8 The fault of the Vatican text we have corrected, trusting in the manuscripts, by substituting univocal [univocum] for unique [unicum].#9 Chapter 2, at the start. ① The Vatican text, contrary to many codices as A G H I S T V Y Z bb and ff and edition 1, has because His [quia eius] for and His [eiusque] and in the minor proposition, contrary to all the codices and edition 1, it has and essence [et essentia] in place of and power [et potentia].#10 Aristotle, Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 10, says: Every nature is a procreatrix of the essence of that, which it is. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 5 (Bk. IV, ch. 4). ① The Vatican text (to which Richard of Middletown consents, here in q. 1), contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3 puts Isaac (though in his book on definitions these words are not found) in place of the Philosopher. ① Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Sent., Bk. I, d. 4. a. 2, and Summa., p. I, a. 30, m. 1, attributes this definition to Boethius, but the editors of (his) works to Henry of Ghent's Grammar. The author of the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 42 says: Nature indeed is a certain force and power engrafted divinely into things to be created, which bestows upon each thing its own being [esse].###p. 135est esse et posse,1 et potentia et essentia; sed esse et essentia in divinis dicunt quid, non ad aliquid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum adiuncto; unde essentia Patris dicit quid: ergo pari ratione potentia generandi.#is ①to be① and ①to be able①,1 and power and essence; but ①to be① and essence among the divine mean a what, not a toward something, whether one says (them) per se, or with an adjunct; whence the essence of the Father means a what: therefore for an equal reason (His) a "power" [potentia] of generating.##4. Item, in divinis idem est secundum rem posse scire et velle; sed non est in divinis scientia propria sive ad aliquid,2 immo scientia dicit quid et est trium, similiter et voluntas: ergo potentia generandi dicit quid sive essentiam.#4. Likewise, among the divine it is the same according to thing to be able to know [posse scire] and to will; but among the divine there is not a proper knowledge [scientia] or a toward something,2 nay rather ①knowledge① (there) means a What and it belongs to Three, similarly also ①will①: therefore the power of generating means a What or essence.##SED CONTRA: 1. Magister dicit in littera, et habetur primo capitulo:3 Posse generare non est posse aliquid, ergo non dicit quid; et dicit quid vel ad aliquid: ergo etc.#BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Master (Peter) says in the text, and (as) it is had in the first chapter:3 To be able to generate is not some ①to be able① [posse aliquid], therefore it does not mean a what; and he says (it is) a what and/or a toward something: ergo etc.##2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: potentiae distinguuntur per actus:4 ergo si actus potentiae dicit quid et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc et potentia similiter. Sed constat quod generare in divinis non dicit quid, sed ad aliquid: ergo nec posse generare.#2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: powers are distinguished through acts:4 therefore if an act of a power means a what and a power; and if it means a toward something, then also power similarly. But it is established that to generate among the divine does not mean a what, but a toward something: therefore neither a to be able to generate.##3. Item, quamvis in creaturis differant virtus et operatio, tamen in Deo idem sunt, sicut vult Dionysius:5 ergo in Deo idem est posse generare et generare; sed generare in divinis dicit ad aliquid et non quid: ergo similiter posse.#3. Likewise, although in creatures virtue and operation differ, however in God they are the same, just as Dionysius (the Areopagite) would have it [vult]:5 therefore in God the same is to be able to generate and to generate; but to generate among the divine means a toward something and not a what: therefore similarly to be able.##4. Item, Pater generat et potest generare: aut ergo ideo potest, quia generat; aut ideo generat, quia potest. Constat quod non ideo potest generare, quia generat: ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare.6 Si ergo ratio proprii debet esse propria, ergo potentia generandi debet esse propria; et nihil est proprium in divinis, nisi quod dicit ad aliquid: ergo etc.#4. Likewise, the Father generates and can generate: therefore, either He can for the reason that [ideo . . . quia] He generates; or He generates for the reason that He can. It is established that He can generate not for the reason that He generates: therefore He generates for the reason that He can generate.6 Therefore if the reckoning of the proper ought to be proper; and nothing is

proper among the divine, except what means a toward something: ergo etc.##5. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae inest creaturae, inest secundum aliquas conditiones sive7 proprietates, ut patet. Posse enim illuminare inest luminoso per lucem, posse calefacere calido per caliditatem. Quamvis autem potentia generandi non sit activa, tamen activae similis est: ergo cum insit Patri, inest per aliquam proprietatem; illa autem proprietas aut dicit quid, aut ad aliquid. Si quid: ergo8 inest omnibus personis, et ita posse generare, quod manifeste negat Magister: ergo dicit ad aliquid: ergo et potentia, quae inest secundum illam: ergo etc.#5. Likewise, every active power, which is within [inest] a creature, is within according to some conditions or7 properties, as is clear. For to be able to illumine is within the luminous through light, to be able to warm in the warm through warmth. Moreover although the power of generating is not active, however it is similar to an active (power): therefore since it is within the Father, it is within through some property; moreover that property either means a what, or a toward something. If a what: therefore8 it is within every Person, and thus (is) 0to be able to generate0,

which Master (Peter) manifestly denies: therefore it means a toward something: therefore also (does) the power, which is within according to it: ergo etc.##0
CONCLUSIO.0Inter tres de hac re opiniones videtur probabilior ea quae asserit, potentiam generandi significare tam relationem quam substantiam, sed in recto relationem.#0 CONCLUSION0Among the three opinions concerning this matter, that seems more probable which asserts, that the power of generating signifies as much a relation as a substance, but in right (speech) a relation.##RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod circa hoc problema tres fuerunt positiones.#I RESPOND: It must be said, that about this problem there were three positions.##Fuerunt9 quidam, qui distinxerunt potentiam generandi dicentes, quod potentia generandi potest dici potentia nuda, vel potentia disposita. Si dicatur potentia nuda, sic voluerunt10 dicere, quod dicit quid et in omnibus tribus personis est, quoniam haec potentia sic dicta consequitur naturam; unde cum natura sit in qualibet persona, similiter et potentia huiusmodi. Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam, quia non habet dispositionem nec convenientiam, ut exeat in actum generationis nisi in sola persona Patris, voluerunt dicere, quod dicit ad aliquid.#There were9 certain (authors), who distinguished the power of generating, saying, that the power of generating can be meant as a bare [nuda] power, and/or as a disposed power. If it is meant as a bare power, so they wanted10 to say, that it means a what and it is in all the Three Persons, since this power, said in this manner, is consequent to the Nature [consequitur naturam]; whence since the Nature is in each Person, similarly also this kind of power. Moreover according to which it means a disposed power, because it has not a disposition nor fittingness, to go forth into an act of generation except in the Person of the Father alone, the wanted to say, that it means a toward something.##Sed verba istius positionis non videntur vera nec sana. Non, inquam, vera, quoniam cuius potentia est nuda, nata est pariter esse disposita; si ergo trium11 est potentia generandi, ut est potentia nuda, similiter et disposita; et ita quaelibet posset generare. Praeterea non videtur sana: ponere enim potentiam nudam, quae similiter se habet ad esse et non esse respectu generationis, quam omnino necessarium est esse, non videtur sane dictum esse sive proprie.#But the words of that position of theirs do not seem true nor sane. I say, not true, since whose power is bare, is bound to be equally disposed; therefore if to the Threell belongs the power of generating, as it is a nude power, similarly also (as) a disposed one; and thus each could generate. Moreover it does not seem sane; for to posit a bare power, which holds itself in the same manner toward being [ad esse] and non-being [non esse] in respect to a generation, which is entirely necessary to be [quam necessarium est esse], does not seem to be sanely or properly said to be.##Fuerunt etiam alii, qui dixerunt, quod cum in divinis sit idem posse et esse, et potentia et essentia, quod, quemadmodum potentia et essentia dicunt quid, similiter esse et posse. Et quemadmodum, cum dico essentiam Patris et essentiam Filii et Spiritus sancti, sive esse Patrem,12 esse Filium, esse Spiritum sanctum, non dico aliam essentiam nec aliud esse, sed alterius et alterius; ita quando dico potentiam Patris, sive Patrem posse generare et Filium posse / gigni, . . .#There were also others, who said, that since among the divine the same is 0to be able0 and 0to be0, (so) also the power

and the essence, because, in accord with the manner power and essence mean a what, similarly \emptyset to be \emptyset and \emptyset to be able \emptyset . And in accord with the manner, when I say \emptyset essence of the Father \emptyset and \emptyset essence of the Son \emptyset and \emptyset essence of the Holy Spirit \emptyset , or \emptyset that the Father is \emptyset ,¹² \emptyset that the Son is \emptyset , \emptyset that the Holy Spirit is \emptyset , I do not mean (that there is) another essence nor that there is an Other, but (the same is) of the one and of the other [alterius et aliterius]; thus when I say (that there is) a power of the Father, or that the Father can generate and that the Son can / be begotten, . . .###1 Mutila Vat. et cod. cc lectio, in qua omittuntur verba ergo multo usque ad et potentia, restauratur ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. \emptyset De prima huius argumenti propositione vide supra d. 2. q. 1 argum. 1. ad opp.#2 Vat. cum pluribus codd. ut H I K S U X Y Z bb ff et ed. 1 post propria addit vel voluntas propria et post sive Vat. sola adiungit scientia et voluntas; praeferimus tamen lectionem aliorum mss. ut A C F G L O R T etc., quae et contextu probatur, quia secus superflue postea poneretur similiter et voluntas.#3 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post initium loco et habetur primo capitulo. Mox Vat. male et contradicentibus mss. omittit et dicit quid vel; pauci codd. ut 1 cc pro et satis bene sed.#4 Communiter allegatur hac de re Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.): Priores enim potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; si autem sic, his adhuc priora opposita (i. e. obiecta). \emptyset Mox mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittitur et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc redintegramus ope ceterorum mss. et ed. 1.#5 Libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. \emptyset 1.#6 Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, pro sed e converso posuimus ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare.#7 Vat. cum cod. cc et loco sive, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.#8 Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ergo.#9 Ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. addit enim.#10 Faventibus antiquis mss. et ed. 1, expunximus hic male additum aliqui moxque post omnibus adiecimus tribus.#11 Cod. H satis bene addit personarum.#12 Vat. hic et post Filium contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 adiicit sive et paulo infra contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit et alterius necnon post generare particulam et. ##1 The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, in which there are omitted the words therefore much up to and power [trans. note: which begin on p. 134], are restored from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1. \emptyset Concerning the first proposition of this argument see above d. 2, q. 1, argument n. 1 to the opposite.#2 The Vatican text, together with very many codices as H I K S U X Y Z bb and ff and edition 1, after proper knowledge [propria] adds and/or a proper will and after or [sive] the Vatican text alone adjoins knowledge and will; we prefer, however, the reading of the other manuscripts as A C F G L O R T etc., which is also proved by the context, because otherwise afterwards there would be superfluously placed similarly also (does) the will.#3 The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has after the start in place of and it is had in the first chapter. Then the Vatican text badly, and contradicting the manuscripts, omits and he says (is is) a what and/or; a few codices as I and cc have well enough but [sed] in place of and.#4 Concerning this matter there is commonly cited [allegatur] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 33 (ch. 4): For acts (are) prior to powers and operations are according to a reckoning; moreover if (they are) thus, to these the opposed (i.e. objects) are prior still.. Then the mutilated reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, in which there is omitted also (does) the power; and if it means a "toward something, then" we have reintegrated with the help of the rest of the manuscripts and edition 1.#5 The book On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 11, and On the Divine Names, ch. 4, \emptyset 1.#6 Having questioned the manuscripts and edition 1, we have put therefore He generates for the reason that He can generate in place of but rather conversely.#7 The Vatican text together with codex cc has and in place of or [sive], but contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1.#8 From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied therefore [ergo].#9 Edition 1 together with one or another of the codices adds therefore [ergo].#10 With the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 in favor, we have expunged here the badly added some [aliqui] and then after all [omnibus] we have inserted the Three [tribus].#11 Codex H well enough adds Persons [personarum].#12 The Vatican text here and after Son [Filium], contrary to very many codices and edition 1, adds or [sive] and a little below this, contrary to the more ancient codices and

edition 1, it omits and (the same) of the one [et aliterius] and also the particle and [et] after generate [generare]. ###p. 136gigni, non dico aliud et aliud posse, sed alterius. Et huius positionis fuit Magister, sicut evidenter apparet in littera.¹ Unde isti dicebant, quod posse generare dicit quid, sed secundum respectum ad aliquid, quia est essentielle tractum ad personam. Cum enim non sit omnimodae abstractionis, potest ad personam trahi. #be begotten, I do not say (that there is) another and that another is able, but (that) of one of the two (is). And to this position belonged Master (Peter), as evidently appears in the text.¹ Whence those of this (position) used to say, that \emptyset to be able to generate \emptyset means a what, but according to a looking-back a toward something, because it is (something) essential extended [tractum] towards a Person. For since it does not belong to every manner of abstraction, it can be extended toward a Person. ##Et ista posito Magistri² satis est probabilis et satis bene videtur sustineri posse. #And that position of Master (Peter) is probably enough and seems to be able to be sustained well enough. ##Fuerunt etiam tertii³ moderniores, qui dixerut, quod potentia generandi dicit ad aliquid in divinis de se. Et ratio eorum est, quoniam potentia dicit habitudinem originalis principii ad principiatum. Et quoniam habitudo potest esse personae ad personam, et tunc vere est habitudo; et essentiae ad creaturam, et tunc secundum modum dicendi sive intelligendi: hinc est, quod principium de sui ratione non tantum est essenziale⁴ appropriatum per additionem, immo etiam dicit proprium personae. Pari ratione, cum potentia dicat orginalem habitudinem, non tantum essentialem, non solum⁵ dicitur vel trahitur ad personam, ut dicat essentiam personaliter, immo dicit proprium, et ita ad aliquid de se. #There were also more modern (authors) of a third (opinion), who said, that a power of generating among the divine means of itself a toward something. And reason is on their side [ratio eorum est], since power means a habitude of a original beginning towards the (thing) begun. And since a habitude can be of a person toward a person, it is then truly also a habitude; and of an essence to a creature, and then (it is such) according to a manner of speaking or of understanding: hence it is, that a principle from its own reckoning is not only an essential⁴ appropriated through addition, nay rather it also means (what is) proper to a person. For an equal reason, since power means an original habit, not only an essential one, it is not said or extended [trahitur] solely⁵ toward a person, so that it means the essence essentially, nay rather it means (what is) proper, and thus of itself a toward something. ##Et positio ista sine praeiudicio videtur probabilior. Nam potentia generandi non videtur dicere nisi fecunditatem ad actum generationis; et illa est proprium personae, unde similiter et potentia.⁶ Nec est simile de posse et esse nisi uno modo. Hoc enim verbum est aliquando per se praedicatur, aliquando est tertium adiacens. Quando per se dicitur, tunc dicit actum absolutum, quia dicit actum entis ratione essentiae; et tunc oportet, quod dicatur absolute et quod dicat quid. Quando vero est tertim adiacens, ut cum dicitur Pater est Deus,⁷ Pater est Pater, tunc hoc verbum est dicit habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum. Et quoniam potest dicere habitudinem ad praedicatum essentiale vel personale, ideo potest dicere esse essenziale et modum essendi personalem. Posse autem de sui ratione propria dicit habitudinem secundum originem; et hinc est, quod specificatur per adiunctum, ut dicat conditionem principii essentialis, vel personalis. Hanc ergo positionem sustinendo respondeo⁸ argumentis probantibus, quod dicit quid. #And that position of theirs without prejudice seems more probable. For a power of generating seems to mean naught but a fecundity for an act of generation; and that is proper to a person, whence similarly also (is) the power.⁶ Nor is it similar concerning to be able and to be except in one manner. For this verb is sometimes is predicated per se, (and) sometimes is a third adjacent. When it is said per se, then it means an absolute act, because it means an act of a being by reason of essence [actum entis ratione essentiae]; and then it is proper, that it be said absolutely and that it mean a what. However when it is a third adjacent, as when there is said \emptyset the Father is God \emptyset ,⁷ the Father is the Father, (and) then this verb is means a habitude of the predicate toward the subject. And since this can mean a habitude toward an essential and/or personal predicate, for that reason it can mean an essential \emptyset to be \emptyset [esse essenziale] and a personal manner of being [modum essendi personalem]. Moreover to be able from its own proper reckoning means a

habitude according to an origin; and hence it is, that it is specified through an adjunct, so that it means a condition of the essential principle, and/or of the personal one. Therefore sustaining this position I respond8 to the arguments proving, that it means a what.##1. Quod enim primum obiicitur, patet: concedo enim, Magistrum fuisse huius positionis. Unde dixerunt, quod eadem potentia potest Filius gigni, qua Pater potest gignere; quod non esset,9 nisi potentia diceret quid. Unde dixit, quod potentia generandi est in Filio, sed non ad generare, sed ad generari. Haec autem positio10 dicit, quod est in solo Patre, quia non tantum respicit naturam, sed proprietatem personae.#1. For what is first objected, it is clear: for I concede, that Master (Peter) was of this position. Whence they said, that the Son can be begotten by the same power, by which the Father can beget; which would not be,9 unless power meant a what. Whence he said, that the power of generating is in the Son, but not for generating, but for being generated. Moreover this position10 means, that it is in the Father alone, because it does not respect the Nature, but a property of a Person.##2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod11 generare consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod in divinis non consequitur naturam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in persona; quia non in qualibet persona est natura fecunda, sed solum in persona Patris, et hoc est per aliquam proprietatem, quae est solius illius personae; non sic est in inferioribus, sicut iam patebit:12 ideo patet quod illud non valet.#2. To that which is objected, that11 to generate is consequent to nature; it must be said, that among the divine it is not consequent to the Nature simply, but to the Nature as in a Person; because not in every Person is the Nature fecund, but only in the Person of the Father, and this is through some property, which belongs to that Person alone; not so it is among inferior (things), just will now be clear:12 for that reason it is clear that that (argument) is not valid.##3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aeternis est idem esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen argumentum nihil13 valet. Quamvis enim omnino sit idem in divinis esse et esse Patrem, non tamen sequitur, quod si esse Patrem est proprium, quod esse sit proprium. Similiter nec si esse sit commune, quod propter hoc esse Patrem.14 Similiter dicendum in proposito.#3. To that which is objected, that in eternal things the same is to be and to be able; it must be said, that it is true; but, nevertheless [tamen], the argument is worth nothing.13 For although it is entirely the same among the divine to be and to be the Father, it does not, however, follow, that if to be the Father is proper, that to be is proper. Similarly neither if to be is common, that on this account to be the Father (is common).14 Similarly it must be said in the proposed (objection).##4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, quod dicit quid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum alio; dicendum, quod non est simile de scientia et potentia. Scientia enim, quantum est de se, dicit qualitatem absolutam, et ideo, quantum est de se, semper dicit quid, nisi trahatur; sed potentia dicit / habitudinem ad originem, . . .#4. To that which is objected concerning knowledge, that it means a what, whether it be said per se, or with an other; it must be said, that it is not similar concerning knowledge and power. For knowledge, as much as it is of itself, means an absolute quality, and for that reason, as much as it is of itself, it always means a what, unless it be extended [trahatur]; but power means / a habitude toward an origin, . . .###1

Cap. 1. circa initium. ❶ Vat. contra plurimos mss. et ed. 1 huiusmodi loco huius, et paulo infra post generare, obnitentibus oedd. et ed. 1, male addit non tantum. Mox et cod. T et ed. 1 post sed posuimus secundum loco etiam; alii codd. omittunt vel sed vel secundum (omissio haec facillima erat, eo quod sed et secundum fere eodem modo abbreviata scribuntur), sed minus bene. Cod. R dicit quid et respectum sive ad aliquid.#2 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Magistri. Paulo ante nonnulli codd. ut K S Z ff ita loco ista, cod. X ideo.#3 Aliqui codd. ut V X Y addunt et.#4 Aliqui codd. ut G aa bb addiunt commune.#5 Omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 essentialem pro essentialiter, quod Vat., mutata interpunctione, refert ad ea quae sequuntur; sed falso, quia opponitur verbo originalem. Ex mss F H P Q T Y ee adiecimus non solum, quod alii codd. cum Vat. omittunt; ed. 1 non hic, sed paulo infra post dicat addit non tantum.#6 Cod. bb addit generandi.#7 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Pater est Deus, quod Vat. cum cod. cc omittit. ❷ De tertio adiacente vide Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1. et Comment. S. Thomae in hunc locum (Lect. 2.), ubi et eadem

distinctio de verbo est proponitur et explicatur: Et non dicitur esse tertium, quia sit tertium praedicatum; sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enuntiatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum. #8 Vat. respondetur, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. #9 Cod. X addit verum. Cfr. lit. Magistri, ch. 2. #10 Scilicet tertia opinio. ¶ Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. loco positio habent potentia, cuius lectionis sensus est: haec autem potentia, scilicet generandi, iuxta praedicta dicit seu nominat illud quod est in solo Patre, nempe fecunditatem ad actum generationis. Melius legeretur: haec autem posito dicit, quod potentia est in solo Patre. #11 Antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc quod pro quomodo. #12 Hic q. 2. praesertim ad 6. et dub. 4. ¶ Paulo ante codd. aa bb post proprietatem addunt scilicet innascibilitatem. #13 Vat., obnitentibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, non loco nihil. #14 Supple: sit commune. ¶ Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittuntur verba Similiter usque Patrem, restauravimus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1. ##1 Chapter 1, near the beginning. ¶ The Vatican text, contrary to very many manuscripts and edition 1, has to a position of this kind [huiusmodi positionis] in place of to this position [huius positionis], and a little below this after to generate [generare], disagreeing with the codices and edition 1, it badly adds not only [non tantum]. Then from codex T and edition 1 after but [sed] we have put according to [secundum] in place of also [etiam]; the other codices omit but and/or according to (this omission was very easy, for the reason that sed and secundum are abbreviated in nearly the same manner), but less well. Codex R reads means a "what" and a looking-back or towards something. #2 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied of Master (Peter). A little before this nota few codices as K S Z ff have thus the [ita] in place of this [ista], codex X has for that reason [ideo]. #3 Some codices as V X and Y add and [et]. #4 Some codices as G aa and bb add common [commune]. #5 All the codices together with editions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 have an essential one [essentialem] instead of the essentially [essentialiter], which the Vatican text, with changed punctuation, refers to those things which follow; but falsely, because it is contrasted with to the word original. From manuscripts F H P Q T Y and ee we have inserted not . . . solely [non solum]. #6 Codex bb adds of generating [generandi]. #7 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied "the Father is God", which the Vatican text together with codex cc omits. Concerning the third adjacent see Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 1, and the Commentary of St. Thomas on this passage (Lect. 2), where the same distinction concerning the word is is also proposed and explained: And it is not said to be a third, because it is third predicate; but because it is a saying placed third in enunciation, which simultaneously with predicate noun makes one predicate. #8 The Vatican text has one responds [respondetur], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. #9 Codex X adds true [verum]. ¶ Cf. the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2. #10 That is, the third opinion. ¶ Very many codices together with the six first editions have power [potentia] in place of position [positio], the sense of which reading is: moreover this power, that is of generating, in accord with the aforesaid means or names that which is in the Father alone, namely a fecundity for an act of generation. It would read better (as): moreover this position means, that the power is in the Father alone. #11 The more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, contrary to the Vatican text and codex cc, have in what manner [quomodo] in place of that [quod]. #12 Here in q. 2, especially at n. 6 and dubium 4. ¶ A little before this codices aa nd bb after property add ,that is, innascibility, [scilicet innascibilitatem]. #13 The Vatican text, disagreeing with very many manuscripts and edition 1, has is not valid [non valet] in place of is worth nothing [nihil valet]. #14 Supply: is common [sit commune]. ¶ The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, in which there are omitted the words Similarly up to the Father, we have restored with the help of the other manuscripts and edition 1. ###p. 137habitudinem ad1 originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et peronsae ad personam. Unde illud simile Magistri non valet secundum hanc positionem, quod,2 sicut una est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater et non vult esse Filius, et e converso, similiter una est potentia, ut videtur. #a habitude toward1 an origin, and for that reason it can mean a proper habitude and of a person toward a person. Whence that similar

(opinion) of Master (Peter) is not valid according to this position, which (says that),² "just as one is the Will, by which the Father wills to be the Father and does not will to be the Son, and conversely, similarly one is the power," as is seen (at the end of his second chapter).##Si quis autem vult sustinere positionem Magistri, de facili potest ad omnes rationes in oppositum respondere.#If anyone, moreover, wants to sustain the position of Master (Peter), he can in an easy manner [de facili] respond to all the reasons to the opposite.##1. Nam nulla ratio probat, quod potentia de se dicat proprium, sed quod potentia generandi active dicta sive posse generare dicat ex adiuncto respectum ad personam, et ita dicit ad aliquid; sed hoc est solum ratione additi. Unde³ notandum quod quatuor sunt genera nominum in divinis. Quaedam enim essentialia sunt dicta essentialiter, ut deitas et maiestas; quaedam essentialia personaliter dicta, ut potentia generandi; quaedam personalia dicta personaliter, ut generans et genitus; quaedam personalia dicta essentialiter, ut missus, incarnatus et huiusmodi,⁴ quae dicunt respectum ad personam, et ideo personalia, et effectum in creatura, et ideo essentialiter sunt dicta.#1. For no reason proves, that power of itself means (something) proper, but (it does prove) that a power of generating said actively or to be able to generate means from [ex] its adjunct a respect toward a person, and thus it means a toward something; and this is solely by reason of the added. Whence³ it must be noted that there are four genera of names among the divine. For are certain essentials said essentially, as the Deity and the Majesty; certain essentials said personally, as the Power of generating; certain personals said personally, as the One generating and the One begotten; certain personals said essentially, as the One sent and the One incarnate and (names) of this kind,⁴ which means a looking-back toward a Person, and for that reason (they are) personals, and a effect in a creature, and for that reason they are said essentially.##2. Duabus rationibus sequentibus facile est respondere, quia illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando actus complectitur totam potentiam;⁵ non sic est in potentia Dei, quia eadem est potentia gignere et gigni in Deo.#2. To the two following reasons it is easy to respond, because that does not have truth, except when the act embraces the whole power;⁵ not so is it in the Power of God, because in God the power to beget and to be begotten is the same.##3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est posse generare et generare; dicendum, quod non valet. Quamvis enim idem sit⁶ Pater et substantia, non tamen sequitur, quod si Pater dicitur ad aliquid, quod et substantia, sicut melius patebit infra.⁷#3. To that which is objected, that to be able to generate and to generate is the same; it must be said, that it is not valid. For although the same is⁶ the Father and the Substance, it does not however follow, that if the Father is said toward something, that the Substance (is) also, as will be clear in a better manner below.⁷##4. 5. Duabus ultimis rationibus difficile est bene respondere; tamen potest quis dicere, quod rationes illae non concludunt, quod potentia dicat ad aliquid de se, sed solum ratione adiuncti, quod est generare; et sic patent cetera.⁸##4. 5. To the last two reasons it is difficult to respond well; however one can say, that those reasons do not conclude, that power means a toward something of itself, but solely by reason of the adjoined, which is "to generate"; and thus the rest are clear.⁸##SCHOLION.#SCHOLIUM##I. In productione divinarum emanationem distinguitur principium quod et principium quo. Ipsae personae producentes sunt principium quod, cum actiones sint suppositorum. Principium quo (sive ratio, qua suppositum agit) divinarum productionum communiter asseritur esse potentiam generandi et spirandi. Sed disputatur, quid est haec potentia, et ciraca hoc inquit hic S. Bonaventura. Aliis verbis haec quaestio sic exprimitur: utrum potentia generandi dicat quid absolutum (essentiam), an relativum sive relationem. Eadem difficultas est circa potentiam spirandi, quae communis est Patri et Filio, de qua infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. Quaestio utraque est potius de modo loquendi quam de gravi aliqua differentia in re. Si autem quaeritur de principio quo utriusque emanationis, quid sit in se, et quomodo alterum ab altero differat, communiter nunc respondetur, esse duplicem fecunditatem, scilicet per modum naturae sive intellectus et per modum voluntatis; de quo vide infra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion. Quoad quaestionem hoc loco tractatam recte observat Scotus (Report., hic. q. 1.), quod diversae sententiae forte possunt conciliari nec videntur contrariari nisi verbis. Quia

tamen contrarii modi loquendi, quos doctores in hac quaestione adhibent, non parum influunt in solutiones aliarum de Trinitate quaestionum, quae infra tractantur, iuvat hic aliqua de variis solutionibus huius quaestionis dicere. ¶ S. Thom. (S. I. q. 41. a. 5.) secundae opinioni hic in corp. positae favens asserit, quod potentia generandi significat ¶ in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relatione ¶, et in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 1.) cum B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) affirmat, eam ¶ esse quasi mediam inter essentielle et personale ¶. Hanc opinionem S. Bonav. dicit esse ¶ satis probabilem, et satis bene videtur sustineri posse ¶, immo ipse in fine solutionis obiectorum argumenta contra eam allata nititur solvere. ¶ Huic positioni directe opponitur sententia Gulielmi Altissiodorensis (vel melius Autissiodorensis, quia nomen Latinum civitatis Auxerre est Austissiodorum vel Autessiodorum) et Durand. (hic q. 1.), qui volunt, hanc potentiam dicere solam relationem. Dionys. Carth. eandem hanc sententiam attribuit S. Bonaventurae ipsamque approbat his verbis: ¶ Videtur verior, quod potentia generativa dicatur pure ad aliquid . . . cum enim dicitur generativa potentia, complexum hoc sumitur in virtute unius dictionis aut nominis; ideo quantumcumque potentia secundum se diceretur absolute, tamen ex tali limitatione et contractione sumitur respective ¶. Sed qui attente ponderat verba S. Doctoris, hic et in dubiis circa litteram 5. 6. 7. scripta, iam perspiciet, ipsum mediam quandam viam eligere. Haec eius sententia clarius apparet ex anecdoto Prologo Seraphici ad II. Sent., ex quo supra. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. a. 1. in Schol., iam aliquid exscripsimus, et nunc prosequimur: ¶ Similiter nec in alio, scil. in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister d. VII. innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum substantiam, et quod alii dicunt, esse dictam secundum relationem et esse proprium, non est controversia, immo utruque verum est, si quis attendat. Nam si divisim loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec

duo nomina, sic, cum nomen potentiae de se sit essentielle et nomen virtutis generativae sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona. Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod connectantur in unius vocabuli intellectum, tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentia generandi quam fecunditatis potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio potentia generandi vel posse generare dicitur secundum relationem. Et sic patet quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, nec una repugnat alteri. Sed hanc sententiam magis appro- / -bavi, . . . ¶#I. In the production of the Divine Emanations one distinguishes the principle which [principium quod] and the principle by which [principium quo]. The Persons producing are themselves the principle which, since the actions belong to the supposits. The principle by which (or reason, by which the supposits act) of the Divine Productions is commonly asserted to be the power of generating and spirating. But what this power is is disputed, and about this St. Bonaventure here inquires. In other words this question is thus expressed: whether the power of generating means and absolute "what" (an essence), or a relative one or relation. There is the same difficulty about the power of spirating, which is common to the Father and the Son, concerning which see below d. 29, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. Each question concerns a manner of speaking rather than some weighty difference on the matter. ¶ Moreover if one asks concerning the principle by which of each emanation, what it is in itself, and who the one differs from the other, it is now commonly responded, that there is a twofold fecundity, that is through a manner of nature or intellect and through a manner of will; concerning which see below d. 13, q. 3 and the Scholium. ¶ In regard to the question treated in this passage (Bl. John Duns) Scotus rightly observes (Reportatio, here in q. 1), that ¶ the diverse sentences perhaps can be reconciled, nor do they seem to be contrary except in words ¶. However because the contrary manners of speaking, which the doctors employ in this question, do not a little flow into the solutions of the other questions concerning the Trinity, which are treated below, it helps here to say something concerning the various solutions of this question. ¶ St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 41, a. 5) favoring the second opinion posited here in the body (of the question) asserts, that the power of generating signifies ¶ in right (speech) the Divine Nature, but in oblique (speech) a relation ¶, and in his Commentary on the Book of Sentences (here on q. 1) he affirms together with Bl.

(now St.) Albert (here in a. 2), that it is a quasi-middle (power) between the essential and the personal. This opinion St. Bonaventure says is probable enough, and seems to be able to be sustained well enough, nay rather he himself at the end of the solution of the objections strives to solve the arguments against it. To this position is directly opposed the sentence of William of Auxerre, whose name in Latin is more correctly Autissiodorensis than Altissiodorensis, since the Latin name for Auxerre is Autissiodorum and/or Autessiodorum, and that of Durandus (here in q. 1), who would have, this power mean a relation alone. (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian attributes this same sentence to St. Bonaventure and approves it with these words: It seems more true, that a generative power means purely toward something . . . for when generative power is said, this complex is taken in virtue of one saying or name; for that reason howsoever much a power according to itself would be said absolutely, however from such a limitation and contraction it is taken respectively. But the one who has attentively pondered the words of the Seraphic Doctor, written here and in the doubts 5, 6 and 7 about the text, will already see throughout, that he has chosen the a certain middle way. This, his sentence, appears more clearly from the Seraphic (Doctor's) unpublished prologue to the Second Book of Sentences, some of which we have already quoted above in d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 in the Scholium, and now continue: Similarly neither in the other, that in the power of generating, have I disagreed with him. Because the same Master (Peter) hints in d. VII, that the power of generating is said according to substance, and that other say, that it is said according to a relation and is (something) proper, there is no controversy, nay rather each is true, if one attends (to the matter). For if we speak in a divided manner [divisim] of the power of generating, according to which it is signified by these two nouns, so, though the noun for power of itself is essential and the noun for generative virtue is personal, it means an essence and/or nature as in a person. Moreover if we speak of that which is signified by those two words, to that they are connected in the understanding of one word, then, since the power of generating is nothing other than a fecundity of power, and a fecundity in producing any person is entirely said according to relation as is not (something) common, but proper, thus without doubt a power of generating and/or to be able to generate is said according to a relation. And thus it is clear that each of those opinions of theirs is true, nor is one repugnant to the other. But this sentence I have rather appro- / -ved . . .

###1 Fide mss. et ed. 1 pro et substituimus ad, quod perfect correspondet dictis in fine corp. #2 Reliquimus cum Vat. quod, licet plurimi codd. habeant quia, sed minus bene. #3 Vat. cum cod. cc Item, et paulo infra post essentialiter ut addit divinitas, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1. #4 Plures codd. ut A I S T V Y aa omittunt incarnatus et huiusmodi. #5 Cod. I addit quando scilicet potentia se habet determinate ad unum actum, ita quod non ad alium. #6 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit et. #7 Dist. 9. q. 2, imprimis ad 3. 6. et d. 26. q. 1. 3. #8 Codd. P Q omnia pro cetera; cod. V patet solutio ad omnia obiecta. #1 Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted toward for and [et], which perfectly corresponds to what is said at the end of the body (of the question). #2 With the Vatican text we have left which (says that) [quod], though very many codices have because [quia], but less well. #3 The Vatican text together with codex cc has Likewise [Item], and a little below this after essentially, as [essentialiter, ut] it adds the Divinity, but contrary to the other codices and edition 1. #4 Very many codices as A I S T V Y and aa omit the One incarnate and (names) of this kind. #5 Codex I adds when, that is, the power holds itself determinately toward one act, so that (it is) not toward another. #6 The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, adds both [et]. #7 Distinction 9, q. 2, first of all at n. 3 and 6, and distinction 26, q. 1 and 3. #8 Codices P and Q have all [omnia] in place of the rest [cetera]; codex V has is clear the solution to all the objections. ###p. 138appro- / -bavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere. In his igitur et aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens debita servata reverentia [desunt aliqua verba] et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem ingenii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potero, sustinere, his tantum exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium. Haec autem sunt octo, ita

quod in quolibet libro sunt duo ¶ etc. #approx- / -ed, because it attains more to the truth of the matter, though for a full expression of the truth it is proper to sustain each (opinion). Therefore adhering to these and the other words of Master (Peter), having observed the reverence due {the other words are lacking} I both have proposed and do propose, in accord with the thinness of (my) genius and the poverty of (my) science in these (things), in which I shall be able, to sustain, with these things only excepted, in which more commonly are not sustained, nay rather the common opinion holds the contrary. Moreover these are eight, so that in each book there are two ¶ etc. ##Secundum hanc explicationem essentia et proprietas personae constituunt principium quod productionum totale, et quidem sic, ut essentia sit quasi fundamentum et initium, proprietas vero ratio completiva et quasi formalis, sive ut Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1.) dicit: ¶ Potentia generandi in divinis dicit quid et ad aliquid, formalius tamen ad aliquid videtur significare ¶. Consentiant Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.), Alex. Hal., (S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. ad ult.) Nec Henr. Gand. (S. a. 54. q. 8. n. 27. et Quodl. 3. q. 14.) et ipse Scotus aliter sentire videntur, licet hic sub aliis distinctionibus respondeat. Et cum etiam S. Thom. doceat, potentiam generandi importare tum essentiam tum relationem, liquet, eos non dissentire nisi in questione, quid per prius intelligi debeat. Ceterum solutio S. Bonaventurae cohaeret cum principiis, quae infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. diffuse defendit. #According to this explanation the Essence and property of a Person constitute the total principle which of the Productions, and indeed in this manner, that the Essence is a quasi-fundament and start, but the property a complete and a quasi-formal reason, or as Richard of Middletown (here in q. 1) says: ¶ The power of generating among the divine means a what and a toward something, however it seems to signify more formally a toward something ¶. (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 1, a. 2) and Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 2, at the last n., agree. Nor does Henry of Ghent (Summa., a. 54, q. 8, n. 27, and Quodlibetals, 3, q. 14) and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus seem to think otherwise, though the latter makes a response under other distinctions. And since even St. Thomas teaches, that a power of generating conveys both an essence and a relation, let it be allowed, that the others do not dissent except in the question, ¶what ought to be understood through (a consideration of what is) prior¶. St. Bonaventure's solution of the rest (of the objections) is coherent with the principles, which he defends at length below in d. 27, p. I, q. 2. ##II. Valde notabilis est doctrina Seraphici (ad 1.) de quadruplici genere divinarum nominum. Haec sumta sunt ex Alex. (loc. cit. a. 1.). #II. Very notable is the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor (at n. 1) concerning the fourfold genus of divine names. These have been taken from Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., a. 1.). ##III. In solutione argumentorum a solito ordine receditur. Ut nempe opinionem Magistri defendat. S. Doctor argumenta pro propria sua sententia secundo loco adducta solvere nititur. Ordinem solutione indicant postillae marginales. Auctoribus iam laudatis addantur: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q., S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 4. ¶ Aegid R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. ¶ Biel, hic q. 1. 2. #III. In the solution of the arguments there is a departure from the usually order. Namely (St. Bonaventure) defends the opinion of Master (Peter). The Seraphic Doctor strives to solve the arguments adduced for his own sentence in the second place. The marginal notes (of the printed edition) indicate the order of the solution. To the authors already praised there are adds: Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), on this and the following question, Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 4. ¶ Giles the Roman, here in the 1st principle of q. 2. ¶ (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1 and 2. ####The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round () brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English. S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis #S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae #atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis #St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio #Cardinal Bishop of Alba #&

Doctor of the Church##Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum#Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences##Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis#of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris##PRIMI LIBRI#BOOK ONE##COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.#COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII##ARTICULUS UNICUS.#Quaestio II.#ARTICLE SOLE#Question 2##Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 138-140.#Cum Notitiis Originalibus##Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 138-140.#Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.##Quaestio II.#Utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.#Question 2#Whether the power of generating is in the Son.##SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio; et quod sic, videtur auctoritatibus et rationibus.#SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the power of generating is in the Son; and that (it is) so, seems from authorities and reasons.##1. Primo sic: Hilarius nono de Trinitate¹ dicit: ¹ Filius habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem ²: ergo natura in Filio est nata generare.¹ First thus: (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) in the ninth (book) On the Trinity¹ says: ¹ The Son has in Himself naturally a Nature being begotten ²: therefore the Nature in the Son has been born to generate.##2. Item, Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum:² ² Neque enim non potuit Filius generare ³, sed duae negationes aequantur uni affirmationi: ergo potuit generare.² Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the book Against Maximinus (says):² ² For neither could the Son not generate ³, but two negations are equivalent to one affirmation: therefore He could generate.##3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: plus ordinatur generare ad generandi potentiam, quam ad potentiam spirandi; sed Pater generans Filium communicat ei³ potentiam spirandi: ergo multo fortius potentiam generandi.³ Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: ³to generate³ is ordained more to the power of generating, than to the power of spirating; but the Father generating the Son communicates to Him³ the power of spirating: therefore much more the power of generating.##4. Item, Filius est expressissima imago Patris: ergo tantum imitatur Patrem, quod non potest cogitari similior; sed si Filius cogitatur ut generans, magis cogitatur imitari: ergo si imitatur amplius, quam possit quis cogitare, ergo et in actu generandi.⁴ Likewise, the Son is the most express image of the Father: therefore He only imitates the Father, because He cannot be thought (to be) more similar; but if the Son is thought to (be) generating, He is thought to imitate (Him) more: therefore if He imitates (Him) more amply, than one can think, therefore also in the act of generating.##5. Item, per simile videtur sic: maior communicatio et diffusio est in luce aeterna quam in luce creata; sed lux creata dat splendori potentiam producendi alium, et sic procedendo; et⁴ si esset infinitae virtutis, produceret infinitos splendores: ergo etc..⁵ Likewise, through (what is) similar it seems thus: a greater communication and diffusion is in the eternal Light than in the created light; but created light gives to splendor a power of producing an other, and thus to (what is) to proceed (from it); and⁴ if it were of an infinite virtue, it would produce infinite splendors: ergo etc..⁶ Item, in generatione carnali pater non dicitur perfectum filium generare, nisi det ei potentiam generandi: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortius,⁵ non erit Filius perfectus, nisi habeat potentiam ad id, ad quod Pater potest: ergo ad generandum. Aut si non est ita in divinis, tunc ergo quaero rationem, quare de perfectione generationis aeternae non sic est communicatio potentiae generandi, sicut in generatione creata.⁶ Likewise, in carnal generation a father is not said to generate a perfect son, unless he gives him the power of generating: therefore for an equal reason, nay rather much more strongly,⁵ the Son will not be perfect, unless He has the power for that, for which the Father can (act): therefore to generate. Or if it is not thus among the divine, then, therefore, I ask for the reason, why concerning the perfection of eternal generation there is not in this manner a communication of the power of generating, as (there is) in created generation.##SED CONTRA: 1. Augustinus contra Maximinum⁶ dicit, ⁶ quod non oportuit Filium generare ⁷; sed si non fuit opportunum, nec conveniens; ergo impossibile fuit, Filium generare: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi, quia omni potentia est potens ille qui habet eam: ergo etc.##BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine (in his book) Against Maximinus⁶ says, ⁶ that it was not proper [non oportuit] that the Son generate ⁷; but if it was not proper [opportunitatem], neither (was it) fitting [conveniens]; therefore it was impossible that the Son

generate: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating, because by every power is able the one who has it: ergo etc..##2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio:8 ¶ Qui potest quod sibi non convenit, quanto magis illud potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in eum ¶: ergo cum Filio non conveniat generare, si posset, potentia illa esset in eo miseria; sed nullam habet miseriam: ergo nec potentiam generandi.#2. Likewise, (St.) Anselm in the Proslogium8 (says): ¶ He who can (do) what is not fitting for him (to do), as much as that is more able (to be done), so much more can there be adversity and perversity in him ¶: therefore since it is not fitting for [cum] the Son to generate, if He could, that power would be a misery in Him; but He has no misery: therefore neither (does He have) a power of generating.##3. Item, ratione probatur hoc idem sic:9 omne illud, in quo aliqua duo necessario distinguuntur, si necessario convenit uni, impossibile est unquam convenire alii, sicut patet: si Petrus et Ioannes necessario differunt in albedine, et albedo convenit Petro, impossibile est, quod Ioanni conveniat; sed Pater et Filius sunt personaliter distincti, ita quod necesse est esse distinctos, et non est dare in quo / distinguantur . . .#3. Likewise by reason this same is proved thus:9 every that, in which two somethings are necessarily distinguished, if it befits one necessarily, it is impossible that it ever befit the other, as is clear: if Peter and John necessarily differ in whiteness, and whiteness is fitting to Peter, it is impossible, that it be fitting to John; but the Father and the Son are personally distinct, so that it is necessary that They be distinct, and there is naught to be granted (in that) in which / they are distinguished . . .###1 Num. 51: Neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam.#2 Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium; in quo textu aliqui codd. non pro neque, alii non potuit Filius non generare.#3 Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 ei, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit.#4 Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit et.#5 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 fortiori, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post ad id omittit ad. Mox pauci codd. ut 1 ff cum ed. 1 habet pro potest.#6 Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium.#7 Cfr. d. 2. q. 1. ad. 1.#8 Cap. 7: Nam qui haec potest, quod sibi non expedit, et quod non debet, potest, quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum. ¶ Sub nomine adversitas intelligitur hic non tribulatio (utpote quae sanctis est bonum), sed nocivum. ¶ Vat. contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 hoc potest pro illud potest.#9 Confusam Vat. et cod. cc lectione, emendavimus ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1 ponendo sic loco sicut, et paulo infra sicut patet pro ut patet sic. Plures codd. aliqui loco aliqua. ##1 Number 51: Nor, again, do we preach that the Father (is) in the Son by a corporal insinuation, but that He had a Nature, naturally begetting in Itself a Nature begotten out of Him of the same genus.#2 Book II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter) above, ch. 1, near the middle; in which text some codices have not [non] in place of neither [neque], others Not (that) the Son could not generate.#3 We have supplied from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 to Him [ei], which the Vatican text together with codex cc less well omits.#4 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits and [et].#5 The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has for a much stronger (reason) [multo fortiori], and a little below this, contrary to very many manuscripts and edition 1, after for that [ad id] it omits for [ad]. Then a few codices as I and ff together with edition 1 have has [habet] in place of can [potest].#6 Book II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter) above, near the middle.#7 Cf. d. 2, q. 1, at n. 1.#8 Chapter 7: For he who can (do) this, which is not expedient for him (to do), and which he ought not (do), can (do), what as much as he can more, so much more can adversity and perversity (be) in him. ¶ Under the noun adversity is here understood not "tribulation" (which, as it is, is a good to the Saints), but the "harmful" [nocivum]. ¶ The Vatican text, contrary to the ancient codices and edition 1, has this is . . .able [hoc potest] in place of that is . . .able [illud potest].#9 The confused reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, we have emended with the help of the other codices and edition 1, by putting thus [sic] in place of just as [sicut], and a little below this just

as is clear [sic] patet] in place of as is thus clear [ut patet sic]. Very many codices have someones [aliqui] in place of somethings [aliqua]. ###p. 139

distinguantur nisi in hoc, quod ille est generans, iste genitus: ergo cum generare conveniat Patri, impossibile est, quod conveniat Filio: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi. #they are distinguished except in this, that the former is the Generating, that of His (is) the Begotten: therefore since \emptyset to generate \emptyset befits the Father, it is impossible, that it befit the Son: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating. ##4. Item, generatio Filii a Patre similis est expresse ipsi² generationi verbi a mente; sed verbum genitum non habet potentiam generandi aliud verbum, immo oportet, quod omne verbum immediate sit a mente: ergo si recte simile est Verbum increatum, non habet potentiam generandi, sed generandi potentia est in solo Patre. #4. Likewise, the generation of the Son from [a] the Father is expressly similar to the very² generation of a word from a mind; but the word begotten does not have the power of generating another word, nay rather it is proper, that every word be immediately from [a] the mind: therefore if the uncreated Word is rightly similar, He does not have a power of generating, but the power of generating is in the Father alone. ##5. Item, fiat argumentatio Augustini³ ducens ad impossibile. Si Filius habet potentiam sive posse generandi, ponatur quod generet; quaero de secundo similiter; et si non est stare in primo, oportet ponere infinitos filios, quia qua ratione non statur in primo, ergo nec in aliquo: ergo si est stare \emptyset quia hoc⁴ repugnat divinae completioni \emptyset sed qua ratione statur in aliquo, statur in primo: ergo primus non habet potentiam generandi. #5. Likewise, let (St.) Augustine's³ argument leading to the impossible be (supposed). If the Son has a power or a \emptyset to be able \emptyset of generating, it is posited that He would generate; I ask concerning the second (son) similarly; and if there is not a standing still [stare] in the first, it is proper to posit infinite sons, because for the reason for which it is not caused to stand still [statur] in the first, therefore neither in any: therefore if there is a standing still \emptyset because this (lack of stability)⁴ is repugnant to divine completion \emptyset but for the reason for which it is caused to stand still in any (son), it is caused to stand still in the first: therefore the first (Son) does not have the power of generating. ##6. Item, fiat argumentatio Richardi:⁵ si generaret Filius alium filium: ergo cum filius genitus magis attineat patri quam avo, secundum hoc non esset ibi summa et aequalis connexio: ergo nec summa et aequalis dilectio:⁶ ergo nec perfecta beatitudo: quae omnia tanquam summe impossibilia respuit pia fides. #6. Likewise, let Richard (of St. Victor)'s argument be (supposed):⁵ if the Son would generate another son; therefore since a begotten son attains to the father more than to the grandfather, according to this there would not be There a most high and equal connection: therefore neither a most high and equal dilection:⁶ therefore neither a perfect beatitude: all of which a pious faith rejects [respuit] as most highly impossible. ## \emptyset

CONCLUSIO. \emptyset Pater potentiam generandi non communicat Filio, quod duabus rationibus probatur. # \emptyset CONCLUSION. \emptyset The Father does not communicate the power of generating to the Son, which is proven by two reasons. ##RESPONDEO: Opinio aliquorum est, quod in Filio est potentia generandi, sed non generat. Hoc autem non est, quia non potest, sed quia non convenit ei.⁷ Et ponunt simile in creaturarum productione sive creatione. Deus potest infinitas creaturas producere; sed quod non producit, hoc non est ex impotentia, sed quia non convenit ei; sic et in proposito. #I RESPOND: The opinion of some is, that in the Son there is a power of generating, but He does not generate. Moreover this is not, because He cannot, but because it is not fitting for Him.⁷ And they posit a similar in the production of creatures or (in) creation. God can produce infinite creatures; but that He does not produce (them), this is not out of impotency, but because it is not fitting for Him; thus also in the proposed (objection). ##SED CONTRA: Ponatur tunc, quod illa potentia, quae est in Filio ad generandum, ducatur in actum; constat quod Filius generabit Deum aeternum: ergo aliquid poterit⁸ incipere habere esse et esse aeternum; hoc autem est impossibile et non intelligibile. #BUT ON THE CONTRARY: It is then posited, that that power, which is in the Son to generate, is lead into act; it is established that the Son will generate an eternal God: therefore something could⁸ undertake [incipere] to have to be and to be eternal; but this is impossible and non-

intelligible.##Propterea⁹ dicendum, quod Pater non communicat Filio posse generare propter duo. Unum est, quia non potest, aliud, quia non debet.##On that account⁹ it must be said, that the Father does not communicate to the Son a ⁹to be able to generate⁹ on account of two (reasons). One is, that He can not, the other, that He ought not.##Ratio autem, quare non potest, haec est: quia fecunditas ad generandum est in Patre, quia principium, et ideo principium, quia primum. Impossibile autem est, quod primum¹⁰ communicet alii primitatem. Nam hic est oppositio in adiecto, quod persona producta sit prima. Quia ergo fecunditas ad generandum ex primitate Patri inerat, ideo non potest eam communicare Filio; et hanc credo propriam esse rationem huius, sicut infra patebit distinctione vigesima septima,¹¹ ubi agetur, quare Pater generat.##Moreover the reason, why He can not, is this: because the fecundity to generate is in the Father, because (He is) the principle, and the principle for the reason that (He is) the first. Moreover it is impossible, that the first¹⁰ communicate primacy to an other. For this is oppositio in adiecto, that a person produced be first. Therefore because the fecundity to generate was in the Father from [ex] a primacy, for that reason He cannot communicate it to the Son; and this I believe to be His own reason, just as shall be clear below in the twenty-seventh distinction,¹¹ where one deals with, why the Father generates.##Similiter non debet communicare, quoniam¹² in emanatione divinarum personarum debet attendi originalis distinctio et plenissima communicatio: originalis distinctio, quia necesse est, ea quae communicant in natura distinguere vel per materiam,¹³ vel per originem. Per materiam distinguere personas est impossibile; quia ubi est talis modus distinguendi, est compositio et variatio et formae multiplicatio, quae omnia Deo repugnant, qui est simplex et invariabilis et vere unum. Et ideo necesse est distinguere per originem sive habitudinem: ergo per generare et generari: ergo si Filius potest generare, potest etiam non distinguere. Si tu dicas, quod adhuc est distinctio, quia unus tantum Pater, alius tantum Filius, alius Pater et Filius; tunc ego oppono tibi, quod secundus filius posset generare eadem ratione, qua primus; et tunc duo essent, quorum uterque esset pater et filius.##Similarly He ought not communicate, since¹² in the emanation of the Divine Persons there ought to be attained an original distinction and a most full communication: an original distinction, because it is necessary, that those which communicate in nature be distinguished through matter,¹³ and/or through origin. Through matter it is impossible to distinguish the Persons; because where there is such a manner of distinguishing, there is composition and variation and the multiplication of form, which are all repugnant to God, who is simple and invariable and truly one. And for that reason it is necessary that They be distinguished through origin or habitude: therefore through generating and being generated: therefore if the Son can generate, He also cannot be distinguished. If you say, that there is still a distinction, because one (is) only the Father, another only the Son, another the Father and the Son; then I oppose you, because a second son could generate for the same reason, for which the first (does); and then there would be two, each of which would be father and son.##Similiter propter plenissimam communicationem - / -em . . .##Similarly on account of a most full communication . . .##1 Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 substituimus distinguantur pro distinguuntur.##2 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit ipsi.##3 Libr. II. contra Maximin. c. 12. n. 3; vide in lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium. ⁹ Paulo infra plures codd. ut A F G H I K W Y etc. cum ed. 1 quaeram loco quaero.##4 Locus difficilis et fortasse corruptus. Subintellige: ponere infinitos filios, sive potius: non stare in aliquo; ideoque particula quia in hac sua positione non directam rationem, sed potius praesuppositionem respectu propositionis conditionalis si est stare indicat, quod hac melior positione apparet: ergo ⁹ quia hoc repugnat divinae completioni ⁹ si est stare. ⁹ Cod. Z ergo necesse est stare. Paulo infra post completionem ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sed.##5 Libr. V. de Trin. c. 10. seqq. et VI. c. 2. seqq. ⁹ Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, post Richardi, addit ut et paulo infra praeter fidem antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 nec non operum Richardi (IV. de Trin. c. 6.) loco patri quam avo ponit ad patrem quam alius.##6 Sequimur cod. 0, dum alii codd. et edd. legunt distinctio, quod nec contextui nec argumentationi Richardi correspondere videtur.##7 Plerique codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt ei, quod tamen, sibi ipsis non constantes, paulo infra, ubi eadem propositio recurrit, apponunt. Mox

ed. 1 cum uno altero ver cod. producat loco producit. #8 Vat. cum cod. cc poterat, sed obstant antiquiores mss. cum ed. 1. #9 Substituimus Propterea loco Propter hoc fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, aliqui tamen mss. deinde addunt vel hoc vel ad hoc. Mox auctoritate eorundem mss. et ed. 1 posse generare posuimus loco potentiam generandi. #10 ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc, qui habent principium pro primum, sed minus concinne. Mox codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut F G H I K cc ee legunt nam haec est, alii ut P Q cum edd. 4, 5 nam hoc est, alii demum cum Vat. et ed. 1 nam hic est. #11 Parte I. a. 1. q. 2. #12 Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus quoniam pro quia. Cod. R post Similiter addit propter emanationem. #13 Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et immediate infra naturam loco materiam, sed falso, ut ex contextu patet. ##1 From very many codices and edition 1 we have substituted (the subjunctive) they are distinguished [distinguuntur] for (the indicative) they are distinguished [distinguuntur]. #2 The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits the very [ipsi]. #3 Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1, about the middle. ¶ A little below this very many codices as A F G H I K W Y etc. together with edition 1 have I will ask [quaeram] in place of I ask [quaero]. #4 A difficult and perhaps corrupt passage. Understand: "to posit infinite sons", or rather: "not to stand still in any (son)"; and for that reason the particle because [quia] in this position does not indicate a direct reason, but rather a presupposition in respect of the conditional proposition, if there is a standing still, which appears better in this position: "therefore ¶ because this is repugnant to divine completion ¶ if there is a standing still". ¶ Codex Z reads therefore it is necessary that it stand still [ergo necesse est stare]. A little below this after completion, we have added from the manuscripts and edition 1 but [trans. note: sed, in opposition to the parenthetical comment]. #5 On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 10 ff., and Bk. VI, ch. 2 ff.. ¶ The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, after be (supposed), adds that [ut] and a little below this, not trusting in the more ancient codices and edition 1, but in the works of Richard (On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 6) in place of to a father, than to a grandfather it puts toward a father than (anyone) else. #6 We follow codex 0, while the other codices and editions read distinction [distinctio], which seems to correspond neither to the context nor to Richard's argument. #7 Very many codices together with edition 1 omit for Him [ei], which they, however, do include, inconsistently, a little below, where the same proposition recurs. Then edition 1 with one or another codex has (the subjunctive) produce [producat] in place of (the indicative) produce [producit]. #8 The Vatican text together with codex cc has (the indicative) could have undertaken [poterat incipere], but the more ancient manuscripts together with edition 1 withstand this. #9 We have substituted On this account [Propterea] in place of On account of this [Propter hoc], trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, however other manuscripts then read this must be said [hoc dicendum] and/or to this (objection) [ad hoc]. Then on the authority of the same manuscripts and edition 1 we have put a "to be able to generate" in place of the power of generating [potentiam generandi]. #10 Thus the older codices together with edition 1, contrary to the Vatican text and codex cc, which have a principle [principium] in place of the first [primum], but less elegantly. Then the codices dissent among themselves; for some as F G H I K cc and ee read for this (saying) is an [nam haec est], other as P and Q together with editions 4 and 5 read for this is [nam hoc est], others still with the Vatican text and edition 1 read for here there is [nam hic est]. #11 Part I, a. 1, q. 2. #12 With the manuscripts and edition 1 favoring it, we have substituted since [quoniam] for because [quia]. Codex R after Similarly adds on account of emanation [propter emanationem]. #13 Very many codices together with edition 1 here and immediately below have nature [naturam] in place of matter [materiam], but falsely, as is clear from the context. ###p. 140 communicatio- / -em non debet communicare, quia multiplicatio suppositorum secundum similem modum egrediendi non est nisi aut propter defectum durationis, sicut dictum est, 1 in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, ut per succesivam generationem perpetuetur esse, aut propter defectum perfectae actionis, ut fiat per plures, quod non potest 2 per unum. Sicut sunt factae plures stellae, quia non sufficeret una ad hoc quod faciunt omnes, sic etiam

plures Angeli et plures animae ad implendam illam civitatem et manifestandum Dei bonitatem, quam nec una anima nec unus Angelus poterat sufficienter manifestare. Cum ergo in Filio Dei sit plenissima communicatio, quia totam infinitem suam dat sibi Pater, non fuit conveniens, quod communicaret Filio illam potentiam: et ideo fuit impossibile, quia inconveniens quodlibet in divinis est impossibile.³ He ought not communicate, because a multiplication of supposits according to a similar manner of stepping forth is not but either on account of a defect of duration, just as has been said,¹ in (regard to) generatables and corruptibles, that (their) "to be" is perpetuated through a successive generation, or on account of a defect of perfect action, so that there is done [fiat] through the more, what cannot (be done)² through the one. Just as more stars have been made, because one would not suffice for that which all do, so also (there are) more Angels and more souls to fill that City (of God) and to manifest the goodness of God, which neither one soul nor one Angel could have sufficiently manifested. Therefore since in the Son of God there is a most full communication, because the Father gives His own whole infinity to Him, it was not fitting, that He communicate to the Son that power: and for that reason it was impossible, because in the divine anything unfitting is impossible.³

##1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Hilarii, quod Filius habet in se naturam gignentem; dicendum, quod verbum illud est improprium, et ex verbis impropriis non est arguendum, sed magis eorum improprietas exponenda, ut Magister superius exposuit. Est enim sensus: habet in se naturam gignentem, id est naturam Patris gignentis.^{#1}. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary through the authority of (St.) Hilary, that the Son has in Himself a nature begetting; it must be said, that that word is improper, and one must not argue out of improper words, but rather their impropriety is to be expounded, as Master (Peter) above expounded (them). For the sense is: He has in Himself a Nature begetting, that is the Nature of the Father begetting.[#]

##2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod neque⁴ non potuit; dicendum, quod Magister bene exponit, id est, non fuit ex hoc impotens. Unde secundum artem distinguendum est, quando dicitur, Filius non potuit generare: quia non potest teneri privative; et tunc est sensus, non potuit, id est, impotens fuit; et tunc negatur potentia, et relinquitur aptitudo, sicut de truncato dicitur, quod non potest gradi, quia aptus natus est ad gradiendum et non potest gradi;⁵ hoc modo non potest dici de Filio, quia non habet ad hoc aptitudinem; et in hoc sensu loquitur Augustinus. Alio modo non posse tenetur negative; et in hoc sensu concedendum est, quod Filius non potuit generare.^{#2}. To that which is objected, that neither⁴ could He not; it must be said, that Master (Peter) expounds (this) well, that is, (that) He was not impotent out of this. Whence technically [secundum artem] one must distinguish, when there is said, the Son could not generate: because not can be held privatively; and then the sense is, He could not, that is, He was impotent; and then power is denied, and aptitude is left behind, just as concerning an amputee [tuncatus] there is said, that he cannot take a step, because (as) one apt he has been born to take a step and he cannot take a step;⁵ in this manner there cannot be said of the Son, that He does not have an aptitude for this; and in this sense (St.) Augustine speaks. In another manner not to be able is held negatively; and in this sense it must be conceded, that the Son cannot generate.^{#3}

##3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod Pater communicat Filio potentiam spirativam; patet responsio: quia cum Filius generetur, non potest habere primitatem respectu generationis; sed cum non spiretur, est inspirabilis; et ideo potuit habere primitatem et fecunditatem respectu illius: et sic patet quod⁶ non valet ratio.^{#3}. To that which is objected: that the Father communicates to the Son a spirative power; the response is clear: because since the Son would generate, He cannot have a primacy in respect of generation; but since He is not spirated, He is unable to be spirated [inspirabilis]; and for that reason He could have a primacy and a fecundity in respect of that: and thus it is clear that⁶ the reason is not valid.^{##4}

##4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est expressissima imago etc.; dicendum, quod ideo Filius dicitur⁷ expressissima imago, quia repraesentat in omnibus, in quibus imago nata est repraesentare; sed imago sic nata est repraesentare, ut tamen ipsa non sit imaginatum; alioquin non esset imago. Si autem Filius repraesentaret in actu generandi, iam esset Pater: et ideo nec intelligibile nec

possibile est, Filium generare sive in generatione Patrem imitari. #4. To that which is objected, that the Son is the most express image etc.; it must be said, that the Son is said⁷ (to be) the most express image for the reason that He represents in all (respects), in which an image is bound to represent; but thus an image is bound to represent, however, so that it not be the (thing) imaged; otherwise it would not be an image. Moreover if the Son would represent in the act of generating, He would already be the Father: and for that reason it is neither intelligible nor possible, that the Son generate or that the Father in generation be imitated. ##5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de luce et splendore, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux non perfecte se multiplicat in primo splendore: ideo in pluribus facit quod non potest in uno. #5. To that which is objected concerning light and splendor, it must be said, that it is not similar, because light does not perfectly multiply itself in the first splendor: for that reason it does in more what it cannot in one. ##6. Similiter et in filio carnali intelligendum; unde unus pater generat plures filios. ⁸ Haec tamen ratio non est principalis, sed illa quae dicta est supra, ⁹ quia in his inferioribus non est fecunditas per rationem primitatis, sed per rationem perfectionis. In Deo autem, quia est perfectissimum et primum, non tantum est per naturam perfectionis; quia tunc in omnibus personis esset, et status¹⁰ esse non posset; sed per rationem primitatis. Item rationes istae non procedunt per simile, immo magis per dissimile. #6. Similarly also in a carnal son (this) must be understood; whence one father generates more sons. ⁸ However this reason is not the principle one, but that which has been said above (is), ⁹ because in these inferiors there is not a fecundity through a reckoning of primacy, but through a reckoning of perfection. In God, moreover, because He is the most perfect and first, it is not only through a Nature of perfection; because then it would be in all the Persons, and (its) standing still¹⁰ could not be; but (also) through a reckoning of primacy. Likewise those reasons do not proceed through the similar, nay rather (they proceed) more through the dissimilar. ## SCHOLION. # SCHOLIUM ## I. Haec quaestio intime cohaeret cum praecedenti. In respons. dicitur: personas distinguere per originem sive habitudinem. Hoc non disunctive intelligi debet, sed sic: per originem cum relationibus inde resultantibus, cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3. et Scholion. ¶ In solut. ad 2. verba: ¶ et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo ¶ etc. facile intelliguntur, si attenditur, quod oratio cum negatione privata exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una negat actum, altera ponit subjectum ex natura sua aptum ad actum. Si igitur verba: Filius non potuit, sumuntur private i. e. ut impotens, tunc supponitur primo, quod ex natura sua sit ad hoc aptus, et deinde asseritur, quod hoc non potest actu. Cfr. S. Thom. et Ricard., hic circa lit. # I. This question adheres [cohaeret] intimately with the preceding In the response there is said: that the Persons are distinguished through origin or habitude. This ought not be understood disjunctively, but rather thus: through origin with the relations resulting from this, cf. below d. 26, q. 3 and the Scholium. ¶ In the solution to n. 2 the words: ¶ and then power is denied and aptitude is left behind ¶ etc. are easily understood, if one attends, that the statement is expounded with a privative negation by two propositions, one of which denies the act, the other of the two posits a subject out of its nature apt for acting. Therefore if the words: The Son can not, are taken privatively, i. e. that (He is) impotent, then there is first supposed, that from the Nature itself He is apt for this, and then there is asserted, that He cannot be in act. Cf. St. Thomas and Richard (of Middletown), here about the text (of Master Peter). ## II. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. ¶ Scot., Report., hic q. 2. (ubi expressis verbis solutionem Seraphici approbat). ¶ S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3. ¶ B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. 11. ¶ Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. princ. ¶ Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 8. et a. 58. q. 1. ¶ Durand., hic q. 3. ¶ Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. ¶ Biel, hic q. 3. # II. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 2. ¶ (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio, here in q. 2 (where he explicitly approves of the Seraphic Doctor's solution). ¶ St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 6, at n. 3. ¶ Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 5, 10, and 11. ¶ (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2 at the beginning. ¶ Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 8 and a. 58, q. 1. ¶ Durandus, here in q. 3. ¶ (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. ¶ (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 3. ## #1 Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. ¶ Vat. omittit

dictum , sed obstant fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1.#2 Supple cum cod. Z fieri, vel
 lerge cum nonnullis codd. ut A S T V et ed. 1 potest unum. Mox ope mss.
 vetustiorum et ed. 1 substituimus factae loco perfectae. Cod. M cum ed. 1 sic
 pro sicut.#3 Vide supra d. 2. q. 1. ad 1. ☉ Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1
 substituimus ergo loco autem.#4 Adiecimus particulam neque, quae ex obiectione
 et contextu requiritur, pro qua cod. T ponit non; plurimi codd. particulam illam
 omittunt legentes quod non potuit, fortase eo quod, sicut supra in obiectione
 notavimus, verba Augustini alio modo allegant, scil. non potuit Filius non
 generare; in qua lectione hic supplenda sunt verba non generare. Cod. T paulo
 infra post Filius habet non non potuit; sed duplex negatio hic non ita
 necessaria videtur, sicut paulo supra.#5 Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba quia
 aptus usque ad gradi, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.#6 Nonnulli codd.
 ut bb ff cum ed. 1 quare.#7 Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ideo et
 loco est substituimus dicitur, ac paulo infra post sed expunximus tamen.#8
 Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt carnales, quod Vat. cum cod. cc superflue
 addit.#9 Scil., prima in corp. huius quaestionis. ☉ Mox post perfectionis codd.
 L O non male adiiciunt tantum.#10 Cod. K principiatus loco status. In fine
 responsionis codd. aa bb addunt quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se. ##1
 Distinction 5, a. 2, q. 1. ☉ The Vatican text has just as there is [sicut est],
 but nearly all the codices together with edition 1 withstand this.#2 Supply with
 codex Z be done [fieri], and or read with not a few codices as A S T V and
 edition 1 one cannot [non potest unum]. Then with the help of the older
 manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted have been made [sunt factae] in
 place of have been perfected [sunt perfectae]. Codex M together with edition 1
 read as [sic] in place of just as [sicut].#3 See above d. 2, q. 1. at n. 1. ☉
 Then, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have
 substituted therefore [ergo] for moreover [autem].#4 We have inserted the
 particle neither [neque], which is required from the context and for the
 objection, in place of which codex T puts not [non]; very many codices omits
 this particle, reading that He could not [quod non potuit], perhaps for the
 reason that, just as we have noted above in the objection, the words of (St.)
 Augustine are quoted in another manner, namely not (that) the Son could not
 generate; in which reading the words not generate [non generare] are to be
 supplied. Codex T a little below this, after the Son, has not could not; but a
 twofold negation here does not seem as necessary, as (it does) a little above.#5
 The Vatican text together with codex cc omits the words because (as) one apt
 [quia aptus] upto to take a step [gradi], but the more ancient codices together
 with edition 1 withstand this.#6 Not a few codices as bb and ff together with
 edition 1 have why [quare].#7 Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1 we
 have supplied for the reason [ideo] and in place of is [est] we have substituted
 is said (to be) [dicitur], and a little below this after but [sed] we have
 expunged nevertheless [tamen].#8 The more ancient codices together with edition
 1 omit here
 carnal [carnales], which the Vatican text together with codex cc superfluously
 adds.#9 That is, first in the body of this question. ☉ Then at but through a
 reckoning of perfection [sed per rationem perfectionis] codices L and O add not
 badly only [tantum].#10 Codex K has being begun [principatus] in place of
 standing still [status]. At the end of the response codices aa and bb add
 because light and a father produce (something) diverse from themselves. #####The
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 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the
 subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in
 English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin
 text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by
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 corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English
 translator. Items in round () brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax
 or which are required for clarity in English.S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis#S. R. E.
 Episc. Card. Albae#atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis#St. Bonaventure of
 Bagnoregio#Cardinal Bishop of Alba#& Doctor of the Church##Commentaria in
 Quatuor Libros Sententiarum#Commentaries on the Four Books of
 Sentences##Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis#of Master Peter Lombard,

Archbishop of Paris##PRIMI LIBRI#BOOK ONE##COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM
 VII.#COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII##ARTICULUS UNICUS.0Quaestio III.#ARTICLE
 SOLE0Question 3##0Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp.
 141-142.#Cum Notitiis Originalibus0#0Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S.
 Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 141-142.#Notes by the Quaracchi
 Editors.0##0 Quaestio III.Utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint
 unica potentia.#0 Question 3Whether the power of generating and the power of
 creating are a unique power.##TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum posse generare et creare
 sit1 unicum posse; et quod non sit unicum, videtur.#THIRD THERE IS ASKED,
 whether to be able to generate and to create is1 a unique to be able; and it
 seems that it is not a unique one.##1. Augustinus:2 0 Alio est Pater, alio est
 Deus 0: ergo alio est generans, alio creans; sed potentia generandi est
 generans, potentia creandi est creans: ergo etc.#1. (St.) Augustine (says):2 0
 To one belongs the Father, to the other belongs God 0: therefore to one belongs
 the one generating, to the other the one creating; but the power of generating
 is the one generating, the power of creating is the one creating: therefore
 etc..##2. Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus per objecta:3 ergo si
 generatio terminatur ad Deum et creatio ad creaturam, et haec sunt omnino
 diversa: ergo etc.#2. Likewise, powers are distinguished through acts and acts
 through objects:3 therefore if generation is terminated at God and creation at
 the creature, and these are entirely diverse: ergo etc..##3. Item, potentiae
 plurificantur per subiecta, quoniam in pluribus potentibus4 plures sunt
 potentiae; sed potentia creandi est in Filio sive posse creare, in eo autem non
 est posse generare: ergo non sunt unum posse.#3. Likewise, powers are plurified
 through subjects, since in more (things) able [in pluribus potentibus]4 there
 are more powers; but the power of creating is in the Son or the 0to be able to
 create0 (is), but in Him there is not a 0to be able to generate0: therefore they
 are not one 0to be able0.##4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum potest
 intelligi, altero non intellecto, et e converso, illa non sunt unum; sed posse
 generare potest intelligi, circumscripta potentia creandi; et e converso posse
 creare, circumscripta potentia generandi:5 ergo etc.#4. Likewise, whatever hold
 themselves thus, that one can be understood, with the other of the two not
 understood, and conversely, those are not one; but 0to be able to generate0 can
 be understood, with the power of creating excluded [circumscripta]; and
 conversely 0to be able to create0, with the power of generating excluded:5 ergo
 etc.##CONTRA: 1. Unius potentis omnino simplicis unicum tantum est posse; sed6
 Pater est potens omnino simplex: ergo unicum tantum habet posse; sed habet posse
 generare et posse creare: ergo illa duo sunt unicum posse.#ON THE CONTRARY: 1.
 To one entirely simple able (thing) there is only one 0to be able0; but6 the
 Father is an entirely simple able: therefore He has only a unique 0to be able0;
 but He has a 0to be able to generate0 and a 0to be able to create0: therefore
 those two are a unique 0to be able0.##2. Item, si posse est aliud et aliud,7 cum
 posse generare respiciat personam, posse creare naturam: ergo natura et persona
 sunt duo: ergo nec natura de persona, nec e converso dicitur, quod est omnino
 falsum.#2. Likewise, if there is one 0to be able0 and an other,7 since 0to be
 able to generate0 regards a Person, 0to be able to create0 the Nature: therefore
 Nature and Person are two: therefore neither is Nature said of the Person, nor
 conversely, which is entirely false.##3. Item, si est distinctio inter posse
 generare et posse creare: ergo est ibi ordo. Quaero igitur, quod si prius8
 secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod potentia generandi, videtur, quia est
 respectu aeterni, et aeternum ante temporale. Sed contra: intellectus communis
 est ante intellectum proprii; sed potentia creandi dicit commune tribus,
 potentia generandi proprium Patris: ergo etc.#3. Likewise, if there is a
 distinction between 0to be able to generate0 and 0to be able to create0:
 therefore there is an order there. Therefore I ask, which is prior8 according to
 the reckoning of understanding. And it seems, that the power of generating (is),
 because it is in respect of the eternal, and the eternal (is) before the
 temporal. But on the contrary: an understanding of the common is before the
 understanding of the proper; but the power of creating means (something) common
 to the Three, the power of generating (something) proper to the Father: ergo
 etc..##0 CONCLUSIO.0Potentia generandi et potentia creandi non secundum rem, sed
 solummodo secundum rationem intelligendi differunt.#0 CONCLUSION0The power of

generating and the power of creating differ not according to thing, but only according to the reckoning of understanding.##RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod posse generare et posse creare est⁹ posse unicum, tamen dupliciter dictum. Unum enim esse est in re esse Patrem et esse Deum, differens autem secundum rationem intelligendi; quia hoc¹⁰ est absolutum, cum dico esse Deum, illud relatum, cum dico esse Patrem. Similiter et in posse est intelligendum. Unde sicut essentia et persona unum sunt in re, tamen est¹¹ differentia rationis in intelligendo et in dicendo; similiter dicendum est de potentia generandi et creandi.#I RESPOND: It must be said, that to be able to generate and to be able to create is⁹ a unique ⁰to be able⁰, said, however, in a twofold manner. For in reality [in re] one ⁰to be⁰ is the ⁰to be the Father⁰ and the ⁰to be God⁰, but differing according to the reckoning of understanding; because this (saying)¹⁰ is absolute, when I say to be God, that one relative [relatum], when I say to be the Father. Similarly also in a ⁰to be able⁰ it must (thus) be understood. Whence just as the Essence and Person are in reality One, nevertheless [tamen] there is¹¹ a difference of reckoning in (their) understanding and in (their) saying; similarly it must be said concerning the power of generating and of creating.##Et¹² sicut est ibi differentia non re, sed secundum rationem, ita est ibi ordo secundum rationem intelligendi. Unde secundum diversas comparationes habent alium et alium ordinem. Comparando enim posse creare et posse generare ad illud cuius sunt; cum posse creare sit naturae, posse generare sit personae, et intellectus communis¹³ ante intellectum proprii; sic absque calumnia prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia creandi. Comparando autem ad illud ad quod terminatur; cum potentia creandi respiciat temporale, potentia vero generandi aeternum; prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia generandi quam potentia creandi; et sic patent obiecta de ordine.#And¹² just as the difference there is not according to thing, but according to reckoning, thus the order there is according to the reckoning of understanding. Whence according to diverse comparisons they have one order and an other. For when comparing ⁰to be able to create⁰ and ⁰to be able to generate⁰ to that to which they belong; since ⁰to be able to create⁰ belongs to nature, ⁰to be able to generate⁰ belongs to person, and understanding of the common (belongs)¹³ before understanding of the proper; so without calumny the power of creating is prior according to the reckoning of understanding. Moreover when comparing (that) to that toward which it is terminated; since the power of creating regards the temporal, but the power of generating the eternal; the power of generating is prior according to the reckoning of understanding to the power of creating; and thus are clear the objections concerning order.##Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod non differunt posse generare et posse creare differentia secundum rem sive secundum essentiam.#Therefore to be conceded are the reasons showing, that ⁰to be able to generate⁰ and ⁰to be able to create⁰ do not differ by a difference according to thing or according to essence.##1. Ad illud ergo¹⁴ quod obiicitur, quod alio est / Deus, alio Pater; . . .#1. To that which is objected, that to one belongs / God, to the other the Father; . . .###1 Vat. hic et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 sint.#2 Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. et 6. ac Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5. ⁰ Vat. contra antiquiores codd. per Augustinum; ed. 1 dicere Augustinus.#3

Aristotelis verba hac de re vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.#4 Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc quia in pluribus subiectis.#5 Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, qui omittunt verba et e converso usque generandi, restauramus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.#6 Adiecimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omisum sed.#7 Cod. bb satis bene si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse.#8 Plurimi codd. non ita bene nec cum subnexis cohaerenter principalius.#9 Vat. contra mss. sunt. Mox post enim nonnulli codd. ut C R S omittunt esse.#10 Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 quod pro hoc, et paulo infra idem est loco illud.#11 Codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut A F G H G K M T V cum ed. 1 pro tamen est habent cum, alii cum Vat. exhibent textum nostrum, cod. R tamen differunt ratione. Mox post rationis nonnulli codd. ut A T X etc. cum ed. 1 addunt particulam et.#12 Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. supplevimus Et. Mox pauci codd. ut H K post rationem habent intelligendi, ita.#13 Faventibus plurimus codd. et ed. 1, expunximus hic additum est.#14 Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus ergo. ##1 The Vatican text here a little after this, not

trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has are [sint].#2 On the Trinity, Bk. II, ch. 1 and 6, and On Psalm 68, Sermon 1, n. 5. ¶ The Vatican text, contrary to the more ancient codices, has Through (St.) Augustine (there is said); edition 1 has (St.) Augustine, you are said (to have said) [dicere Augustinus].#3 See the words of Aristotle on this matter above in q. 1, fundament 2.#4 Thus the more ancient codices together with edition 1, but the Vatican text together with codex cc has because in more subjects [quia in pluribus subiectis].#5 The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, which omit the words and conversely up to of generating excluded, we have restored with the help of the other manuscripts and edition 1.#6 We have inserted from the older manuscripts and edition 1 the less well omitted but [sed].#7 Codex bb has well enough if ¶to be able to create¶ is one ¶to be able¶ and ¶to be able to generate¶ an other.#8 Very many codices, not so well nor coherently with what is subjoined, read more principal [principalius].#9 The Vatican text, contrary to the manuscripts, has are [sunt].#10 The Vatican text, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, has what [quod] in place of this (saying) [hoc], and a little below this the same is [idem est] in place of that [illud].#11 The codices do not agree among themselves; some as A F G H K M T V together with edition 1 have with in place of nevertheless there is [tamen est], others together with the Vatican text exhibit our text, codex R reads there differ in reckoning [differunt ratione]. Then after of reckoning [rationis] not a few codices as A T X etc. together with edition 1 adds the particle both [et].#12 Trusting in the manuscripts and the six of the first editions we have supplied And [Et]. Then a few codices as H and K have a reckoning of understanding [ratioem intelligendi, thus].#13 With very many codices and edition 1 favoring it, we have expunged the here added is [est].#14 From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted therefore [ergo]. ### p. 142Deus, alio Pater; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de alio et alio alietate rationis, et non rei. Et intelligitur alietas rationis per illum modum, quo supra dictum est distinctione quinta,1 ubi quaeritur, utrum essentia generet.#God, to the other the Father; it must be said, that (St.) Augustine speaks of the one and the other according to an otherness of reckoning, and not of thing. And otherness of reckoning is understood through that manner, by which it has been said above in the fifth distinction,1 where there is asked, whether the Essence would generate.##2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod2 potentiae distinguantur per actus etc.; dicendum, quod verum est hoc de illis actibus, qui habent completionem ab obiectis; sed non sunt sic actus divini. Unde quamvis creatura et Filius omnino differant, attamen generatio et creatio idem sunt, sicut essentia et persona. Deus enim in agendo non completur ab obiecto, quia se ipso agit.#2. To that which is objected, that2 powers are distinguished through acts etc.; it must be said, that this is true concerning those acts, which have (their) completion from (their) objects; but not so are the divine acts. Whence although a creature and the Son differ entirely, however generation and creation are but the same, just as essence and person. For God in acting is not completed by an object, because He acts by His very self [se ipso].##3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae plurificantur per subiecta; dicendum, quod istud verum est de subiecto proprio; sed Filius non in quantum Filius est subiectum potentiae creandi, sed in quantum Deus. Et constat, quod natura divina non facit numerum cum Patre; ita nec potentia respiciens naturam cum potentia Patris.#3. To that which is objected, that powers are plurified through subjects; it must be said, that that is true concerning a proper subject; but the Son (is) not, inasmuch as He (is) the Son, a subject of a power of creating, but rather inasmuch (as He is) God. And it is established, that the Divine Nature is not numbered [non facit numerum] with the Father; thus neither (is) the power regarding the Nature (numbered) with the power of the Father.##4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero et e converso; dicendum, quod aut loqueris quantum ad3 significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Si quantum ad connotatum, verum dicis, quod creatura potest intelligi, non intellecta persona Filii, et e converso. Si quantum ad principale significatum, dicis4 falsum; impossibile est enim, intelligi potentiam generandi sine potentia creandi, sicut impossibile est intelligere personam sine essentia.#4. To that which is objected last, that the one can be understood without the other of the

two and conversely; it must be said, that either you are speaking as much as regards the signified, or as much as regards the connoted. If as much as regards the connoted, you speak a truth, because a creature can be understood, the Person of the Son not understood, and conversely. If as much as regards the principle signified, you speak falsely; for it is impossible, that the power of generating be understood without the power of creating, just as it is impossible to understand the Person without the Essence.###SCHOLIUM.##I. De differentia inter essentiam et personam cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2. et Scholion. Ad verba in solut. ad 3: Verum est de subiecto proprio, notandum, quod distinguitur subiectum proximum et adaequatum alicuius potentiae et remotum. Subiectum proximum sive primarium potentiae divinae creativae est unicum scil. Essentia divina. Et axioma: potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, non oportet quod sit verum, quando agitur de subiecto remoto, quod est persona divina.##I. On the difference between essence and person cf. below, d. 33, q. 2 and the Scholium. Regarding the words in the solution to n. 3: that is true concerning a proper subject, it must be noted, that a proximate subject is distinguished from an adequate (subject) of any power and a remote one. The proximate or primary subject of the Divine Creative Power is unique, namely, the Divine Essence. And the axiom: powers are plurified through their subjects, does not have to be true, when it concerns a remote subject, which is a Divine Person.##II. Hanc quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici non nisi breviter tractant. Ipsam tangit S. Doctor infra d. 20. a. 1. q. 1. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; de Potent. q. 2. a. 6. Petr. A Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. Richard. A Med., hic q. 4. Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 3. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.##II. The other ancient Scholastics do not but briefly treat of this question. The same is touched upon by the Seraphic Doctor below in d. 20, a. 1, q. 1. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 1. and 2. St. Thomas, here at q. 1, a. 3; de Potent., q. 2, a. 6. (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 3, a. 1. Richard of Middleton, hic q. 4. Giles the Roman, on this and the following question, here in 1. princ., q. 3. (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian., hic q. 2.##1. Art. 1. q. 1.##2. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit quod. Proxime sequens propositio intelligitur de illis actibus, qui causantur aliquo modo ab objectis, sicuti fit in intellectione nostra.##3. Cod. Z propter subnexa non incongrue addit principale i. e. quod primo et per se significatur, exclusa omni connotatione.##4. Antiquiores codd. ut A F G H K S W etc. vel omittunt dicis, quod tunc certe est supplendum, vel cum ed. 1 loco ipius ponunt est.##1. Article 1, q. 1.##2. The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 omits that [quod]. Next the following proposition is understood of those acts, which are caused in some manner by their objects, just as happens in our act of understanding [intellectione].##3. Codex Z, on account of what is subjoined, does not incongruously add principle [principale], that is, that which is first and per se signified, having excluded every connotation.##4. The more ancient codices such as A F G H K S W etc. either omit you say [dicis], which then certainly is to be supplied, and/or with edition 1 put is [est] in its place.##The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that

which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round () brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English. S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis#S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae#atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis#St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio#Cardinal Bishop of Alba#& Doctor of the Church##Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum#Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences##Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis#of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris##PRIMI LIBRI#BOOK ONE##COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.#COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII##ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quaestio IV.#ARTICLE SOLEQuestion 4##Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas,

1882, Vol 1, pp. 142-144. #Cum Notitiis Originalibus Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, #Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 142-144. #Notes by the Quaracchi Editors. ## Quaestio IV. Utrum posse generari et posse creari sint univocum posse. # Question 4 Whether "to be able to be generated" and "to be able to be created" are a univocal "to be able". ## ULTIMO QUAERITUR, utrum posse generari et posse creari sint posse univocum. Et quod non, videtur: # LAST THERE IS OBJECTED, whether to be able to be generated and to be able to be created are a univocal to be able. And it seems that (they are) not: ## 1. Quia quamvis idem sit generare et creare quantum ad principale significatum, aliud tamen est generari et creari, sicut Creator et creatura: ergo cum non habeant esse univocum creatura et Creator: ergo etc. # 1. Because, although it is the same to generate and to create as much as regards the principal signified, nevertheless it is another to be generated and to be created, as Creator and creature (are): therefore since Creator and creature do not have a univocal to be: ergo etc. ## 2. Item, creatio dicit egressum et mutationem, generatio vero omnem excludit mutationem: ergo cum posse creari importet potentiam transmutandi, posse generari non, cum potentiae differant in sua generalitate in potentia transmutandi, et in hac non conveniunt: ergo in nulla. # 2. Likewise, creation means an egress and a mutation, generation, however, excludes every mutation: therefore since to be able to be created introduces a power of being transmuted [transmutandi], (and) to be able to be generated (does) not, since the powers differ in their generality in the power of being transmuted, and in this they do not convene: therefore (they convene) in no (power). ## 3. Item omne distribuit terminum pro omnibus, quae univocantur vel analogantur in illo; sed cum dico omnipotens, non fit distributio pro illo, quod potest generare, quia tunc Filius non esset omnipotens: ergo manifestum est, quod utrumque posse nec est univocum nec analogum: alioquin omnipotentia non convenit Filio. # 3. Likewise every distributes a term on behalf of all, which are univocally and/or analogically meant [univocantur vel analogantur] in it; but when I say omnipotent, a distribution does not come to be on behalf of that, which can generate, because then the Son would not be omnipotent: therefore it is manifest, that each to be able is neither univocal nor analogical: otherwise omnipotence would not befit the Son. ## SED CONTRA: 1. Res est commune ad fruibile et utibile: ergo cum aequalis ambitus vel maioris sit possibile quam res, et non sit maior differentia inter generatum et creatum quam inter fruibile et utibile, pari ratione possibile sive posse est commune ad utrumque. # BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Thing is common to the enjoyable and the usable: therefore since the possible belongs to an equal and/or greater ambit than the thing, and (since) there is not a greater difference between the generated and the created than between the enjoyable and the usable, for an equal reason the possible or to be able is common to each. ## 2. Item, in aeternis non potest esse multiplicitas / nec diversitas: . . . ## 2. Likewise, in eternal things there cannot be multiplicity / nor diversity: . . . ## 5 Mss. plurimi cum sex primis edd. sit. # 6 Vat., obnitentibus multis codd. ut H I S T W Z aa etc. et ed. 1, minus apte habeat. # 7 Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.), ubi species potentiae recensentur et pro genere earum proximo, in quo omnes conveniunt, assignatur, quod sint principium motus aut transmutationis. # 8 Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 26.): Quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam omne dicitur. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summula. tract. de Distributione. Mox antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 generare; Vat. et cod. cc. non bene generari. Agitur quidem de generatione passiva, sed argumentatio incipit a potentia activa, importata in voce omnipotens, et recte infertur, si potentia activa generandi non cadit proprie sub omnipotentia, tunc et generatio passiva non cadit sub omnia quae potest: ergo etc. # 9 Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatum pro creaturam. ## 5 Very many manuscripts together with the six first editions have is [sit]. # 6 The Vatican text, disagreeing with many codices as H I S T W Z aa etc. and edition 1, has less aptly does not have [habeat]. # 7 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 17 and Bk. IX, text 2 (Bl. IV, ch. 2, and Bk. VIII, ch. 1), where the species of power are recounted and for their proximate genus, in which they all agree, there is assigned, that they are the principle of movement or transmutation. # 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 34 (Bk. IV, ch. 26): Of those (terms) which

indeed the position does not cause a difference every is said. Cf. Peter of Spain, Summula, tract "On Distribution". ¶ Then the more ancient codices together with edition 1 have to generate [generare]; the Vatican text and codex cc have the not well said to be generated. Indeed one deals with passive generation, but the argumentation begins from active power, introduced under the word omnipotent, and rightly is it inferred, that if an active power of generating does not properly fall under omnipotence, then passive generation also does not fall under the all which it can (accomplish): ergo etc..#9

Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted the created [creatum] for the creature [creaturam]. ###Op. 143nec diversitas: ergo cum posse creari et posse generari ab aeterno ante conditionem creaturae fuerint, ergo non1 habent multiplicationem in ipsa potentia.#nor diversity: therefore since there were a ¶to be able to be created¶ and a ¶to be able to be generated¶ from eternity before the foundation of creation [ante conditionem creaturae], therefore they do not1 have a multiplication in the power itself.##3. Item, cum dico: creatura potest creari, nihil dico2 creatum; quia illud vere dicitur de eo quod omnino nihil est, sicut de anima antichristi: ergo solum dico potentiam agentis; sed potentia Dei est unica, non habens aliquam multiplicatatem: ergo eius posse univocum est ad posse creari et posse generari.#3. Likewise, when I say: ¶a creature can be created¶, I mean2 nothing (is to be) created; because that is truly said of that which is (yet) entirely nothing, just as (one presently speaks) of the soul of the Antichrist: therefore I solely mean the power of the agent; but the power of God is unique, not having any multiplicity: therefore to Him there belongs a univocal ¶to be able¶ regarding ¶to be able to be created¶ and ¶to be able to be generated¶.### CONCLUSIO.¶Posse generari et posse creari quoad principale significatum re idem sunt et univoce dicuntur, quoad connotatum vero analogice.# CONCLUSION¶¶To be able to be generated¶ and ¶to be able to be created¶ in regard to the principal signified by the thing are the same and are said univocally, however in regard to the connoted (they are said) analogically.##RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod cum dico posse creari et posse generari, dico principale significatum et dico connotatum. Quantum ad principale significatum, dico, quod posse creari idem dicit re, quod posse creare, differens solum3 modo loquendi vel dicendi: quia quod dicitur per modum actionis per posse creare, dicit posse creari per modum passionis. Quantum vero ad connotatum dicit effectum in creatura.#I RESPOND: It must be said, that when I say to be able to be created and to be able to be generated, I mean the principal (thing) signified and I mean the (thing) connoted. As much as regards the principal (thing) signified, I mean, that ¶to be able to be created¶ means the same in thing, which ¶to be able to create¶ (means), differing solely3 by a manner of speaking and/or meaning: because what is meant through a manner of action by ¶to be able to create¶, ¶to be able to be created¶ means through a manner of passion. However as much as regards the connoted, it means the effect in the creature.##Quando4 ergo comparantur posse creari, et posse generari, si comparentur ratione principalis significati, dico, quod non tantum est univocum, immo etiam unicum, ut visum est,5 aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum, sicut posse generare et posse creare. Si autem ratione connotati comparentur, sic concedo, quod est analogum, sicut hoc nomen res ad fruibilia et utibilia. Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum.#When,4 therefore, ¶to be able to be created¶ and ¶to be able to be generated¶ are compared, if they are compared by a reckoning of the principal signified, I say, that not only it is univocal, nay rather (it is) also unique, as it has been seen,5 however (it is) in one way and (is) understood and enunciated in another [aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum]. But if they are compared by a reckoning of the connoted, thus I concede, that it is analogous, just as the noun thing (is) regarding enjoyables and useables. For although the Creator and the creature do not have a common univocal (term), nevertheless [tamen] they do have a (common) analogous one.##Notandum tamen, quod duplex est analogia: quaedam6 per reductionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum7 distribuit pro omnibus contentis, nisi sit distributio restricta ex additione, vel ex usu sive modo loquendi, sicut dicitur distributio accomoda,8 ut si dicatur: caelum tegit

omnia. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia.⁹ Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens inter omnia, sed super omnia.##It must be noted, however, that analogy is twofold: a certain⁶ (kind of analogy is) through a reduction toward unity of nature according to prior and posterior; and this can be by comparing creature to creature, and in this the sign⁷ distributes on behalf of all contained, unless there is a distribution restricted out of an addition, and/or out of use or a manner of speaking, just as a suitable [accommoda] distribution⁸ is meant, such as if one says: ☉heaven covers all☉. The other is the analogy through reduction toward unity of proportional similitude, not of nature; and what is thus analogically spoken of is not among others, but over others.⁹ Whence distribution, properly on behalf of that, does not distribute, unless it has been extended. Whence God is not a being among all (beings), but over all.##Et hinc est, quod omnipotens non distribuit pro potentia generandi proprie accepta distributione, nisi fiat quaedam extensio, et ex illa per consequens fiat quaedam appropriato circa suppositum. Unde proprie omnipotens convenit tribus, quia non distribuit¹⁰ pro potentia generandi; appropriate autem, secundum quod fit ampliatio ex parte signi, solius est Patris.##And hence it is, that ☉omnipotent☉ does not distribute on behalf of the power of generating properly accepted as a distribution, unless a certain extension be made, and from that, per consequens, a certain appropriation be made about the subject [suppositum]. Whence properly ☉omnipotent☉ convenes to Three, because it does not distribute¹⁰ on behalf of a power of generating; but appropriately, according to which there is an amplification [fit ampliatio] on the part of the sign, it belongs to the Father alone.##Ex his patent omnia obiecta; procedunt enim per diversas vias, ut patet intuiti.##From these all the objections are clear; for they proceed by diverse ways, as is clear to the one looking intently at them [patet intuiti].##☉ SCHOLION.##☉ SCHOLIUM##I. Ut subtilis haec quaestio, quae a paucis antiquis Scholasticis tractatur, recte intelligatur, attendendum est, quo sensu S. Doctor accipiat locutionem: posse creari. Non sumitur in sensu passivae potentiae, quae est ex parte creaturae, sed in sensu activae potentiae, quae est in Deo, ut patet ex ult. arg. Ratio huius modi loquendi explicatur infra d. 42. q. 4, ubi S. Doctor inter alia haec habet (ad 2.): ☉ mundum creari, quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa. ☉ Item (ad 1.): ☉ Possibile potest dici denominative a potentia passiva vel activa; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur possibile simpliciter secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva ☉. Hanc sententiam probat in corp. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2. et 3, et S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certe res creabilis ante suam creationem nihil omnino est nec habet, ergo nec potentiam passivam; unde solummodo denominatione extrinseca i. e. cum respectum ad primam causam, attribuitur ipsi posse creari.##I. To understand rightly this subtle question, which is treated by few of the ancient Scholastics, one must attend to the sense in which the Seraphic doctor accepts the saying: to be able to be created. It is not taken in the sense of a passive power, which is on the part of the creature, but in the sense of an active power, which is in God, as is clear from the last argument. The reason for this manner of speaking is explained below in d. 42, q. 4, where the Seraphic Doctor says among other things the following (at n. 2): ☉ ☉☉☉(the power of) the world to be created☉ [mundum creari], although it means a power through a manner of passion, however according to thing it does not mean but an active power, because before the creation of the world there is nothing but active power. ☉ Likewise (at n. 1): ☉The ☉possible☉ can be said denominatively by reason of [a] a passive and/or active power; and because in God there is properly an active power, for that reason the ☉possible☉ is meant simple according to that which is denominated by it, not according to which (is) from a passive (power) ☉. He proves this sentence in the body (of the response). Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 2 and 3, and St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2. Certainly a creatable thing before its own creation is entirely nothing nor has (anything), therefore neither (does it have) a passive power; whence only in the

manner of a extrinsic denomination, i. e. with regard to the prime cause, is there attributed to it a to be able to be created.##II. His suppositis tres propositiones S. Doctoris sunt manifeste: 1. Posse creari et posse creare, licet differant grammaticaliter, non differunt in re, si attenditur principale significatum, quod est creatrix essentia divina. ¶ 2. Posse creari et posse generari ratione principalis significati sunt univoca, immo unicum. ¶ Nam ipsa divina substantia sub ratione, qua communicabilis est per generationem, est potentia, qua Filius potuit generari ¶, Richard (hic q. 3). ¶ 3. Posse generari et posse creari ratione connotati non habent aliquid commune nisi analogum, cum primum connotet Filium aeternum, secundum vero creaturam.##II. With these supposed, the three propositions of the Seraphic Doctor are manifestly: 1. To be able to be created and to be able to create, though they differ grammatically, they do not differ in thing, if one attends to the principal (thing) signified, which is the Divine, creative Essence. ¶ 2. To be able to be created and to be able to be generated by reason of the principal signified are univocal, nay rather unique. ¶ For the Divine Substance Itself under the reckoning, by which it is communicable through generation, is the Power, by which the Son could be generated ¶, Richard of Middletown (here at q. 3). ¶ 3. To be able to be generated and to be able to be created by reason of the connoted do not have anything common except the analogous, since the first connotes the eternal Son, but the second a creature.###1 Cod. W nec.#2 Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 dicit; cod. I creaturam posse creari, nihil dico esse creatum. Paulo infra post sicut cod. M addit est.#3 Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum in; aliqui codd. solo pro solum. Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, dicitur per loco dicit.#4 Mendosa lectio Vat. Quo modo pro Quando castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1.#5 Paulo supra; vide etiam quaest. praeced.#6 Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit est, quod tamen abest a ceteris mss. et ed. 1.#7 Id est omne, quod ideo vocatur signum, quia per ipsum indicatur, quantum alius terminus valeat.#8 Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 accomodata, et paulo infra proportionis loco proportionalis. Pauci codd. regit pro tegit, sed incongrue et contra Petr. Hispan. Summulam tract. de Distributione. ¶ Mox post naturae codd. aa bb addunt ut Creatoris ad creaturam.#9 Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus sed super alia, et paulo infra, consentientibus omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus sed super omnia.#10 Codd. M X addunt proprie. ##1 Codex W reads neither do they [nec].#2 The Vatican text together with codex cc, contrary to the rest of the codices and edition 1, has it means [dicit]; codex I reads that the creature can be created, I say that nothing is created. A little below this after just as [sicut] codex M reads as it is (presently) concerning the soul [est de anima].#3 Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the here added in [in]. Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has is meant by "to be able to be created" [dicitur per posse creari] in place of "to be able to be created" means [dicit posse creari].#4 The faulty reading of the Vatican text, By that manner which [Quo modo] instead of When [Quando], is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1.#5 A little above this; see also the preceding question.#6 The Vatican text together with codex cc has a certain one is [est quaedam], which is is absent from the rest of the manuscripts and edition 1.#7 That is "every", which is for that reason called the sign, because through it there is indicated, how much the other term is worth.#8 The Vatican text, not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has an accommodated distribution [accomodata distributio], and a little below this of the similitude of proportion [proportionis similitudinis] in place of proportional similitude [proportionalis similitudinis]. A few codices have rules [regit] in place of covers [tegit], but incongruously and contrary to Peter of Spain's, Summula, tract "On Distribution". ¶ Then after of nature [naturae], codices aa and bb add as of the Creator to the creature.#9 From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied but above others [sed super alia], and a little below this, with the consent of all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, we have inserted but over all [sed super omnia].#10 Codices M and X add properly [proprie]. ###¶p. 144III. Quoad analogiam in genere cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 5. et ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad. 1. ac Scholion. Duplicem analogiam distinguit textus: prima species est quae fit per reductionem ad unitatem naturae; secunda, per

reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis. Circa primam speciem haec notamus. In unoquoque genere rerum creatarum est unum, quod sic est mensura aliorum, ut unumquodque in tantum habeat perfectionem suae naturae, in quantum plus minusve ad hanc mensuram accedit. In prima haec specie analogiae ¶ signum distributivum (v. g. omnis) distribuit pro omnibus contentis ¶ i. e. applicat conceptum termini ad omnia et singula sub ipso comprehensa. Sed hoc non valet quoad secundam speciem. Secunda species sive analogia proportionalitatis declaratur in textu. Ex hoc principio S. Doctor deducit, quod potentia generandi in Deo non comprehendatur proprie sub omnipotentia (in corp. et dub. 1. 2.). Idem docent: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. ¶ Scot., Report., I. Sent. d. 20. q. 2. ¶ B. Albert., hic a. 3. ¶ Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. ¶ Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1. et 2. ¶ Dionys. Carth., hic. q. 3. ¶ Consentit etiam S. Thom. I. Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3; tamen de Potentia q. 2. a. 5. aliter loquitur. Videtur autem, quod solus modus loquendi sit diversus.##III. In regard to analogy in general cf. above d. 1, dubium 5, and ibid., a. 3, q. 1 and the Scholium. The text distinguishes a twofold analogy: the first species is that which comes to be through a ¶ leading back¶ [reduction] toward the unity of nature; the second, through a leading back toward the unity of proportional similitude. About the first species we note these (things). In any one genus of created things there is one, which is thus the measure of the others, so that anyone (of them) has perfection of its nature only inasmuch as it approaches more or less this measure. In this first species of analogy ¶ a distributive sign (e. g. ¶ every¶) distributes on behalf of all those contained ¶, i. e. it applies the concept of the term (it modifies) to all and each comprehended under it. But this is not valid in regard to the second species. The second species or the analogy of proportionality is explained in the text. From this principle the Seraphic Doctor deduces, that the power of generating in God is not comprehended properly under ¶ omnipotence¶ (in the body and in dubium 1 and 2). (The following) teach the same: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 3. ¶ (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, q. 2. ¶ Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 3. ¶ (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3. a. 2. ¶ Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, principle 1, q. 1 and 2. ¶ (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. ¶ St. Thomas also agrees, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 6, at n. 3; however in On Power, q. 2, a. 5 he speaks otherwise. But it seems, that solely (his) manner of speaking is diverse.##IV. Quoad conclusionem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. ¶ B. Albert., hic a. 4.##IV. In regard to the conclusion cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 1 and 2. ¶ Bl. (now St.) Albert, here in a. 4.####The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round () brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis#S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae#atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis#St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio#Cardinal Bishop of Alba#& Doctor of the Church##Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum##Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences##Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis#of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris##PRIMI LIBRI#BOOK ONE##COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.¶COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII¶DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI#DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER###Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 144-146.#Cum Notitiis Originalibus¶¶Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,#Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 144-146.#Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.¶###DUB. I.##DOUBT I##In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima est de solutione ista Magistri, qua dicit, quod non sequitur: Pater potest generare, quod non¶ Filius: ergo potest aliquid, quod non Filius; et respondet, quod posse generare non est posse aliquid subiectum divinae potentiae. Sed hoc non videtur solvere, sed aggravare argumentum. Tunc enim, cum posse generare¶ sit posse maximum, videtur quod maius

inconueniens sequatur, et magis derogetur potentiae Filii, si in hoc deficit, quam si in subiectis³ divinae potentiae. #In that part of his (text) there occur doubts about the text, and the first concerns that solution of Master (Peter's), which says, that it does not follow (that if): the Father can generate, what the Son (can) not:1 therefore He can (do) something, which the Son (can) not; and he responds, that to be able to generate is not to be able (to do) something subject to the divine power. But this does not seem to solve, but rather aggravate the argument. For then, since to be able to generate² is the maximum to be able, it seems that a more unfitting (conclusion) follows, and it derogates more from the power of the Son, if (His power) fails in this, than if (it fails) in (those acts) subject³ to the divine power. ##RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Magister bene solvit. Potentia enim Patris habet comparari ad inferius et ad aequale, sed ad superius non, cum careat superiori. Cum comparatur ad inferius, tunc est potentia essentialis et essentialiter retenta, quia connotat respectum⁴ in creatura; et respectu talis potentiae inconueniens esset, quod aliquid posset Pater, quod non posset Filius, quia tunc different per essentiam. Cum autem comparatur ad aequale, ut ad personam, tunc trahitur ad personam; et tunc nullum inconueniens est, si aliqua proprietas personalis est in Patre, quae non est in Filio. Ideo non sequitur, quod aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.⁵ #I RESPOND: It must be said, that Master (Peter) solves (it) well. For the power of the Father has to be compared to an inferior and to an equal, but not to a superior, since He lacks [careat] a superior. When it is compared to an inferior, then it is an essential power and (is) essentially retained, because it connotes the looking-backwards [respectum]⁴ (that is) in a creature; and in respect of such a power it would be unfitting, that the Father would be able (to do) something, which the Son would not be able (to do), because They would then differ by Essence. Moreover when it is compared to an equal, as to a Person, then it is extended [trahitur] toward a Person; and then there is nothing [nullus] unfitting, if there is some personal property in the Father, which is not in the Son. For that reason it does not follow, that there is some power in the Father, which is not in the Son.⁵ ## DUB. II. # DOUBT II ## Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod generatio Filii non est de omnibus. Videtur enim Richardus de sancto Victore⁶ dicere contrarium, qui dicit, quod quia omnipotens est, excusari non potest, quin Filium genuerit: ergo generatio Filii continetur sub omnipotentia: ergo Filius inter omnia continetur et est. #Likewise is doubted concerning this which is said, that the generation of the Son does not concern all. For Richard of St. Victor⁶ seems to say the contrary, he who says, that because He is omnipotent, it cannot be excluded [excusari], that the Son generate: therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained and is among all. ##RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, generatio Filii non continetur sub omnipotentia, nisi acciperetur omnipotentia per appropriationem. Et quod dicit Richardus non intelligitur,⁷ tanquam Filius sit inter omnia, sed tanquam ante omnia; unde arguit a posteriori. Si enim emanatio naturae secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit emanationem secundum rationem voluntatis, nunquam Deus esset potens producere creaturam per voluntatem, nisi etiam produxisset Filium per naturam. #I RESPOND: It must be said, that, just as Master (Peter) says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence, unless omnipotence would be accepted through appropriation. And what Richard says is not understood,⁷ as if the Son is among all, but as before all; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of the Nature according to the reckoning of understanding preceded the emanation according to the reckoning of the Will, God would never be able to produce a creature through (His) Will, unless He also produced a Son through (His) Nature. ## DUB. III. # DOUBT III ## Item videtur male dicere, cum dicit, quod esse Patrem non est esse aliquid; quia cum inter aliquid et nihil non cadat medium, si non est esse aliquid: ergo est esse nihil.⁸ #Likewise he seems to speak badly, when he says, that to be the Father is not to be something; because between something and nothing falls no medium [non cadit medium], if it is not that "that He is something": therefore it is that "He is nothing".⁸ ##RESPONDEO: Esse aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel communiter ad essentiam et personam; et sic non cadit medium, et in hoc sensu esse Patrem est esse aliquid; alio modo, prout trahitur⁹ ad essentiam; et sic

cadit inter esse aliquid et esse nihil medium, scilicet esse aliquem; persona enim praedicatur ut quis, non ut quid.¹⁰ I RESPOND: To be something is said in a twofold manner: (it is said) for example [vel] commonly regarding "essence" and "person"; and thus there falls no medium, and in this sense to be the Father is to be something; in another manner, insofar as it is extended⁹ to "essence"; and thus there does fall between to be something and to be nothing a medium, that is, to be someone; for a person is predicated as a who, not as a what.¹⁰ DUB. IV. DOUBT IV##Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari, et ponitur ibi: Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius etc. Videtur ista illatio non valere, quia in creaturis, ubi / magis differt relatio a supposito, . . .#Likewise is asked concerning that illation of Master (Peter's): "the Holy Spirit could be the Son, therefore He could be changed", and it is posited there (where he says): For if He could be born, He could be the Son etc. That illation of his seems to be not valid, because in creatures, where / relation differs more from a supposit, . . .##1 Supple hic et paulo infra cum codd. X dd potest.#2 Vat. confuse et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 Cum loco Tunc, et deinde prosequitur: enim generare eum posse sit posse etc.#3 Vat. falso pro in subiectis ponit eum generare Filium esset aliquid subiectum et contra omnes codd. cum ed. 1, qui in eo tantum dissident, quod multi ut A C F G H M R S T etc. post quam minus bene omittunt si. Cod. si enim in hoc deficit, plus deficit, quam si deficit in subiectis.#4 Praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 praemittit Vat. effectum seu, et paulo ante ponti tenta pro retenta.#5 De hoc et sequenti dubio vide hic q. 3. et 4. cum Scholiis.#6 Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4: Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per impossibilitatem excusari non potest.#7 Aliqui codd. intelligit; codd. H O intelligas. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 post arguit substituimus a pro ex.#8 Ita mss. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. si Pater non esset aliquid, ergo esset nihil. Resp. Dicendum quod esse etc.#9 Plerique codd. ut A F G K T U V Y etc. cum ed. 1 contrahitur.#10 Plura vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ##1 Supply here and a little below this with codices X and dd can [potest].#2 The Vatican text confusedly and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 has When [Cum] in place of Then [Tunc], and then it proceeds to read: for "to be able to generate Him" is the greatest "to be able" etc..#3 The Vatican text falsely, in place of in (those acts) subject [in subiectis], puts "that He generates the Son" would be something subject and contrary to all the codices together with edition 1, which dissent only in this, that many of them as A C F G H M R S T etc. after than [quam] omit less well the if [si]. Codex O has for if in this it fails, it fails more, than if it fails in (those acts) subject (to the divine power).#4 Not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, the Vatican text prefaces this with an effect or [effectum seu], and a little before this it puts held [tenta] in place of retained [retenta].#5 Concerning this and the following doubt see here q. 3 and 4 together with the Scholia.#6 On the Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 4: But who without doubt is omnipotent, cannot be excluded through an impossibility.#7 Some codices read does not understand [non intelligit]; codices H and O have you may not understand [non intelligas]. A little below this from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 after he argues [arguit] we have substituted a [a] in place of ex [ex].#8 Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1, but the Vatican text reads if the Father would not be something, therefore He would be nothing. I respond: It must be said that to be etc..#9 Very many codices as A F G K T U V Y etc. together with edition 1 read it is contracted [contrahitur]. [Trans. note: It is common in English to use the notion of extended⁹ to mean applied to, even though strictly speaking what is extended reaches outside⁹ some limit. This latter sense is not contained in the Latin trahitur, since it would imply that the Son is of another Being than the Father.]#10 (For) more (on this) see above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. ###Op. 145magis differt relatio a supposito, potest dici, quod1 similis potest esse alteri dissimilis sine sui mutatione: ergo cum filiatio et spiratio sint relationes, pari ratione Filius poterit esse Spiritus sanctus, et e converso sine mutatione. Item, omne mutabile est aliquid praeter illud, secundum quod mutatur, ut si non album fiat album, est aliud quam albedo: ergo si intelligatur Spiritus sanctus mutari, si generetur, tunc aliud esset in eo generatio, aliud ille qui generatur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.#relation differs more from supposit, it can

be said that the1 similar can be dissimilar to the other of the two without its own mutation: therefore since filiation and spiration are relations, for an equal reason the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely without mutation. Likewise, every mutable is something besides that, according to which it is changed, so that if a non-white becomes white, it is other than whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit is understood to be changed, if He would be generated, then in this the one would be the generation, the other the That who is generated; but this (is) false: ergo etc..##RESPONDEO: Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur, quod proprietas2 insit hypostasi, intelligitur esse hypostatis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse. Cum ergo Spiritus sanctus non possit simul spirari et generari 0 quia quamvis una persona possit duobus modis producere, tamen una persona non potest nisi uno modo produci 0 sequitur de necessitate: si potest Spiritus sanctus esse Filius vel potuit, potest non esse Spiritus sive non spirari; et si potuit generari, potuit esse: et ita potuit fieri de ente non ens et de non ente ens, ac per hoc mutari.#I RESPOND: It is otherwise in the relations of creature and God: since relations in creatures do not grant relatives to exist; whence a thing can be without them and with them; but among the divine they grant Persons to exist; and for that reason if there is understood in the Persons, what a property2 is in [insit] a hypostasis, it is understood to belong to a hypostasis, and similarly, if it is understood to not be in (a hypostasis), it is understood not to belong to a hypostasis. Therefore since the Holy Spirit could not simultaneously be spirated and generated 0 because although one Person could produce in two manners, nevertheless [tamen] one Person cannot but be produced in one manner 0 it follows of [de] necessity: if the Holy Spirit can and/or could be the Son, He can not be the Spirit or (He can) not be spirated; and if He could be generated, He could be (the Son): and thus He could be made a 0not being0 from a 0being0 and a 0being0 from a 0not being0, and through this be changed.##Et sic3 patet ultimum, quia non dicitur mutari propter diversificationem proprietatum circa idem suppositum, sicut est in mutatione naturali, sed propter corruptionem et inceptionem eiusdem. Nec est illud simile: Pater potest generare et spirare sine sui mutatione: ergo Spiritus sanctus4 generari et spirari; quia non est inconveniens, unum principium pluribus modis producere, sed unum principiatum pluribus modis produci est impossibile et impossibile; et ideo patet illud.#And thus2 the last (objection) is clear, because one is not said to be changed on account of a diversification of properties about the same supposit, just as is in natural mutation, but on account of corruption and inception of the same. Nor is that similar: "the Father can generate and spirate without His own mutation: therefore the Holy Spirit (can)4 be generated and spirated"; because it is not an unfitting (conclusion), that one principle produce by more manners, but that One begun be produced by more manners is impossible and impossible [impossible]; and for that reason that (objection) is clear.##0 DUB. V.#0 DOUBT V##Item videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia est essentia, quia secundum hoc generare, quod nullo modo est essentiale, nullo modo esset potentiae.#Likewise it seems that he speaks a falsehood, when he says: the Father is not able except by nature; for His power is by essence, because according to this "to generate, what in no manner is essential", would in no manner belong to (His) power.##RESPONDEO: Quamvis potentia, absolute considerata, sit idem quod essentia, tamen potentia, quia non est nomen adeo abstractum sicut essentia, trahitur ad personam. Unde potentia generandi non dicit naturam divinam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in tali persona, scilicet innacibili; ideo non est simile de hoc nomine essentia et de hoc nomine potentia.5#I RESPOND: Although power, absolutely considered, is the same (thing) which essence (is), nevertheless [tamen] "power", because it is not a noun so [adeo] abstract as "essence", is extended to a Person. Whence "the power of generating" does not mean "the Divine Nature" simply, but "the Nature as (it is) in such a Person", that is, (in) an Innascible One; for that reason the (case) is not similar concerning this noun essence and concerning this noun power.5##0 DUB. VI.#0

DOUBT VI##Item videtur male dicere ibi: Aliam significes potentiam, qua Pater potest gignere etc.; quia potentiae divisio sufficiens est per activam et passivam;6 sed posse generare dicit potentiam activam, posse gigni potentiam passivam: ergo non potest alia potentia significari.

Si tu dicas, quod generare non est agere proprie, similiter nec generari pati; obicitur, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus;7 sed aliud est gignere et aliud gigni: ergo alia est potentia huius et illius. #Likewise it seems that he speaks badly there (where he says): You signify the one power, by which the Father is able to beget etc.; because there is a sufficient division of power by active and passive;6 but to be able to generate means an active power, to be able to be begotten a passive power: therefore another power cannot be signified. If you say, that to generate is not to act properly, nor (is) to be generated similarly to suffer; it is objected, that powers are distinguished through acts;7 but it is one (thing) to beget and another to be begotten: therefore there is another power belonging to the latter and to the

former. ##RESPONDEO: Ista distinctio, quam ponit Magister de potentia gignendi active et passive, fundatur super hoc, quod potentia potest considerari secundum id quod est; et sic dicit naturam, et sicut una natura est in generante et genito, sed alio est alio modo, sic eadem potentia. Potest iterum considerari secundum id ad quod est; et sic dicit modum existendi naturam in persona in comparatione ad alium, qui est principium vel principiatum. Et sic, cum diversi modi sint, diversae dicuntur proprietates posse generare et posse generari et distinguuntur secundum actus personales; sed primo modo non. #I RESPOND: That distinction of his, which Master (Peter) posits concerning the power of begetting and of being begotten [potentia gignendi active et passive], is founded upon this, that power can be considered according to that which it is; and thus it means the Nature, and just as one Nature is in the One generating and the One begotten, but in the other it is in another manner, so (it is) the same power. Again it can be considered according to that toward which it is; and thus it means a manner of existing that the nature (has) in a Person in comparison to the other, who is the beginning and/or the begun. And thus, since there are diverse manners, the diverse properties are called the to be able to generate and the to be able to be generated and they are distinguished according to personal acts; but not (so) in the first manner. ##DUB. VII. #DOUBT

VII##Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius sive qua potest gigni. Videtur enim dubium vel falsum, quia gigni omnino est a gignere, et gignere est a potentia Patris: ergo et gigni. #Likewise is asked concerning this which he says,, that the Son has a power, by which He can be the Son or by which He can be begotten. For it seems dubious and/or false, because to be begotten is entirely from to beget, and to beget is from [a] the power of the Father: therefore also to be begotten. ##RESPONDEO: Sicut potentia gignendi in Patre non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam ex se producere aliam, sic potentia gignendi in Filio non dicit nisi naturam8 in persona ut natam duci ab alia; sicut enim hypostasi Patris convenit generare, sic hypostasi Filii convenit generari. Nec valet quod obicitur in contrarium. Nam omne quod habet Filius, sive essenziale sive personale, habet a Patre. Ideo quamvis ipsum gigni sit a potentia Patris, non excluditur tamen,9 quin potentia gignendi passiva sit in Filio. Sed illa potentia non / est principium generationis, . . . #I RESPOND: Just as in the Father the power of begetting means naught but the Nature in the Person as it is bound [natam] out of Itself to produce an Other, so in the Son the power of being begotten [potentia gignendi] means naught but the Nature8 in the Person as it is bound to be lead from an Other; for just as "to generate" is fitting to the hypostasis of the Father, so "to be generated" is fitting to the hypostasis of the Son. Nor is what is objected in the contrary valid. For everything which the Son has, whether essential or personal, He has from [a] the Father. For that reason although "that He is begotten" is from the power of the Father, it nevertheless [tamen] does not exlude,9 that the power of being begotten [potentia gignendi passiva] is in the Son. But that power is / not the principle of generation, . . . ##1 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit idem. #2 De varia acceptione huius nominis proprietas, quatenus scilicet convenit cum relatione et ab ea distinguitur, sicuti et de relationibus in Deo vide infra d. 26. per totam. 0


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#####0###1###E###F###Y###Z###[###v###  
##### ## ##  
    ###   ###   ###   ##(   ##)   ##*   ##E   #####   ##   ##   ##   ##   ###  
  
####  
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##;##;##[]##veevee[]##### #hF#l##h\  
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##aJ###&#hF#l##h\H#5#CJ##OJ##QJ##\#^J##aJ#####hF#l##h\  
H#5#OJ##QJ##\#^J###)#hF#l##h\H#B*#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##aJ##ph#####hF#l##h\  
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J#####hF#l##h\H#OJ##QJ##^J##aJ#####hF#l##h\  
H#6#OJ##QJ##]#^J#####hF#l##h\H#OJ##QJ##^J###)#hF#l##h\  
H#B*#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##aJ##ph##'#####1###Z###[###v#####  
#####  
#####M##kdS####$##$If#####T###0###
```

##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$If####a\$##M##kd####\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$If####a\$## 0###
##) ##* ##0 ###
##0#####0#####0#####0#####Z#####Q#####
Q#####
\$\$\$If####a\$##M##kd0####\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T##M##kd0####\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$If####a\$####

##Q
##T
##^
##`
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##0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####

\$\$\$If####a\$#####\$If####M##kdL####\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## #

##P
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#####J###K##### ###!
###"#####t#####
n0n00#!#hF#l##h0\H#5#0H*#0J##QJ##\#0^J## #hF#l##h0\
H#CJ0#0J##QJ##^J##aJ0####hF#l##h0\H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J###'#hF#l##h0\
H#5#06#0H*#0J##QJ##\#0J#0^J####hF#l##h0\H#5#0J##QJ##\#0^J### #hF#l##h0\
H#0J##QJ##^J##mH

#SH

[illegible]

[illegible]

#SH

```
#####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J##aJ#####hF#l##h0\H#6#00J##0J##j#0^J#####hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J#####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J###&#hF#l##h0\H#5#0CJ##0J##QJ##\
#0^J##aJ### #hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J##aJ##)AZ##DZ##}Z##0Z##0Z##0Z##0Z##0Z##0Z##0#####0#####
#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####T#####
#####M##kd:
```

###\$##\$#If#####T###00###
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####40#
#####a0###0T###M##kd0####\$##\$#If#####T###00###
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$##\$#If####a\$#####\$#If#####0Z##t\
##`^##a^##0^##0_##0_##0_##0_##Wa##0#####0#####0#####
#####0#####Z#####U#####P#####0#####\$
#a\$#####\$#a\$##M##kd0

##+##< #####<

```
#####0#0##6###0####0###0#####0###0#####0###0#####0###030#####□#40#  
#####a0###0T###M##kd0
```

###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##-##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$##
Y^##`^##a^##f^##k^##0^##0^##0^###_###_##

"##\$##
%#####'##(#####u##v##9#####C##U#####
##-##/
##0##v#####J##M##`##c##e##f#####
##\
##]##g#####H#####
#####hF#l##h\H#>*#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##%#hF#l##h\H#5#CJ##H*#OJ##QJ##\
#^J##%#j#####hF#l##h\H#CJ##OJ##QJ##U##^J#####hF#l##h\
H#OJ##QJ##^J##aJ###"#hF#l##h\H#6#CJ##OJ##QJ##]#^J#####hF#l##h\
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##<###+##8##M##O##P##}#####n##w###

[illegible]

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##3

##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd0\$###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##< #####<

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T####0D##0D##0D###E###E##WE##XE##vE##0E##0E##0E##0E##0E##0E##F#
#)F##*F##VF##WF##XF##cF##dF##lF##mF##nF##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##
#0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##000000000000{00000{0000#####
#####hF#l##h0\H#5#00J##QJ##\#0^J#####hF#l##h0\
H#0J##QJ##^J##aJ###'hF#l##h0\H#5#0B*0J##QJ##\#0^J##phwww###hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J#####hF#l##h0\H#6#00J##QJ##J#0^J###)hF#l##h0\
H#B*#CJ##0J##QJ##^J##aJ##ph##0###hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J###hF#l##h0\
H#0J##QJ##^J##mH #sH

*0D##XE##0E##0E##0E##0E##*F##WF##0#####0#####0#####0##
#####0#####Q#####0#####0#####0#####
#####M##kdE&###\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd0%###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T##

###\$##\$If####a\$##WF##XF##dF##mF##nF##0F##0F##0#####0#####0#####
#####Z#####Q#####Q#####0#####
###\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd0&###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd0&###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T####0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##0F##
#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
#####0#####Z#####M##kd0'###\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd>'###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T##
0F##0F##TG##VG##XG##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##H###H##!
H###H##RH##0#####0#####0#####0#####0###
#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
###\$##\$If####a\$####\$If#####M##kd0'###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#####0####0#####0###030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ###\$##\$If####a\$####\$If#####0F###G##
G##SG##TG##VG##XG##nG##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##0G##H###H###H###H###H###
H##!H###H##QH##RH##SH##TH##dH##0H##0H##0H##0H##0H##0H##0H##I##&I##1I##6I##=I##?
I##@I##0000000000o10000i0000n0000n0000o#hF#l##h0\H#CJ0#0J##QJ##^J##aJ0##
hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J##mH##sH#####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J##aJ#####hF#l##h0\

H#6#00J##QJ##]#0^J#####hF#l##h0\H#5#00J##QJ##\#0^J#####hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J#####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J### #hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J##aJ###&#hF#l##h0\H#5#0CJ##0J##QJ##\#0^J##aJ##+RH##SH##0H##?
I##@I##0I##0J##0#####0#####0#####Z#####0#####
0#####
#####M##kd0(###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$If####a\$##M##kd7(###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T####@I##hI##iI##0I###J##
J###J###J##0J##0J##0J##0J##K##@K##iK##zK##0K##0K###L##L##L##

-###\$##\$#If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0###030#####[]#40#
#####a0###0T#####\$If#####M##kdu+###\$##\$If#####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0###030#####[]#40#
#####a0###0T#####0_##0_###`##D`##E`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`##0`###a###a###a#
#3a##4a##ja##la##na##oa##0a##0a##0a##0a##0a##0a###b###b###b##

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T###M##kd0/###\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$##\$If####a\$###0##0##d0##00##00##
□###0##0#####0#####0#####Z#####0#####0#####

M##kd00###\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T## \$\$\$##\$If####a\$##M##kd00###\$##\$If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####□#40#
#####a0###0T####!0##S0##h0##l0##00##00##00##
□##0##0##0##0###0###0##0###0##h0##s0###0##d0##q0##v0##00##00##c##0##0###0#
##0##

[illegible]

[illegible]

```
#####0#0#6###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###030#####40#
#####a0###0T##    ###$##$If####a##M##kdr>###$##$If#####T###00###0
##+##C      #####C
```

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0####0#0####0####0#0####0####030#####[]#40#
#####a0###0T## ##\$##\$If####a\$#####\$If#####0##00##00##00##00##00##0##

#0##0###0#0####0#0##P0##R0##T0##c0##n0##00#####0##;0#@0##00####0####0##&
0##00##00##00##00##00####0###0###V0#[0####+0##30####00####0##s0##□0###0#0
0##00##00##00##0####0###0##00##00##00##0####0###r0##s0##t0##u0##v0##000000000000
000δY%#hF#l##h0\H#5@CJ##H*#OJ##QJ#\
\#0^j##%#j#@###hF#l##h0\H#CJ##OJ##QJ##U##^j####hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^j#####hF#l##h0\H#6#0OJ##QJ##] #0^j###!#hF#l##h0\H#5@H*#OJ##QJ#\
#0^j###hF#l##h0\
H#OJ##QJ##^j##>P0##00##00##00####0##00##00####0##r0##0#####0#####0##
#####0#####0#####Z#####0#####0#####
#####M##kdk?#####\$I f####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#
#####a0###0T###M##kd#?#####\$I f####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#
#####a0###0T## ##\$###If####a###r0##s0##u0##0###0###0 ##0 ##0 ##0

##0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####]
X#####S#####\$a\$#####\$a\$#M##kdUA
###\$###If####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#
#####a0###0T#####\$If#####M##kd0?#####\$I f####T###00###0
##+##C #####C

#####0#0##6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#
#####a0###0T####v0###00##00##00##0####0###0##
0##(0##90##; 0##<0##u0##v0###00##00##00##0####0###0###0###0###G0##H0##00##00##0
0##00##00##0##0##0###0###0###0##
0##" 0###0##50##90##D0##H0##j 0##n0##p0##r0##00##00##00##00##00##00##0##0##0##0###
#####%### (###X###o###z###0####0####0####0####0####0#####/
###L###3###o###r###t###00
000000000000000000000000####%#hF#l##h0\H#5@CJ##H*#OJ##QJ##\#0^j##"#hF#l##h0\
H#6#0CJ##OJ##QJ##] #0^j#####hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##OJ##OJ##^j##Pt###v###0###0###0###0###0###0##### ###

##.

##/

##0

##P

#####c###d########0###4#####_###f#####k###l#####

#####\$###.########E#####'###C###K#####

#####hF#l##h\H#5#0J##QJ##\#^J#####hF#l##h\
H#6#0J##QJ##]#^J#####hF#l##h\H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J####!#hF#l##h\H#5#H*#0J##QJ##\
#^J#####hF#l##h\H#0J##QJ##^J##F ##
##.

##/

```
##c###d###0###k###0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
###Z#####0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
###M##kd0B###$##$If#####T###00###0
##+##C          #####C
```

```
#####0#0##6###0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#####40#
#####a0###0T##
```

```
#####If####a$###k###l###E#####  
#####Z#####Q#####Q#####Q#####  
#####    #####If####a$##M##kdCC####$###If#####T###  
##+##C          #####C
```

```
#####0#0#0#6##0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###030#####40#
#####a0###0T##    ##$##$If####a$##M##kd0B###$##$If#####T###00###0
##-##C      #####C
```

```
#####0#0##6##0###0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#  
#####a0###0T###0###0###0###0#####0#####0#####8###0###0##  
#####2###;#####%###&###'###(###)###9###:###f###j###0###0###0###0#####-  
###r###s###0###0###0###0###0###0###00000000000000000000qл000|0|0000|000|0|  
00#####&#hF#л##h0\H#6#0CJ##0J##QJ##]0^J##aJ###  
#hF#л##h0\H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J##aJ#####hF#л##h0\H#CJ##H*#0J##QJ##^J##aJ##  
%#j0D###hF#л##h0\H#CJ##0J##QJ##U##^J####hF#л##h0\H#>*#0J##QJ##^J####hF#л##h0\  
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J#####hF#л##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J#####hF#л##h0\H#5#00J##QJ##\  
#0^J##+0###0###0###0###0###8###  
%###0#####0#####0#####Z#####0#####0#####  
#####M##  
kd0C###$###I f#####T###00###0  
##+##C #####C
```

```
#####0#0##6##0###0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####[]#40#
#####a0###0T##    ###$##$If####a$##M##kd0C###$##$If#####T###00###0
##-##C      #####C
```

```
#####0#0#6##0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###030#####40#
#####a0###0T####%###&###(###0###0###y"##z"##|"###%###
%##0#####0#####0#####0#####0#####W#####
#U#####P#####U#####$a$#####M##kd0E###$##$If####
T###00###0
##+##C          #####C
```

```
#####0#0##6##0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###0#0###0###030####[]#40#
#####a0###0T#####$If#####$If####M##kd<D###$$If####T###00###0
##+##C#####C
```

```
#####0#0##6##0###0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030####□#40#  
#####a0###0T### 0###0###0###0###0#### ## ### #X ##\ ##0 ##0 ####!###!###!##]!  
##f!#0#!#0!###"###"###"#b"#d"#x"#y"#z"# | "#####$###%###%###%###%###  
%##0%##00000000□□□□000□000□□000000{ { f#####) #hF#l##h0\  
H#B*#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##aJ##ph##0####hF#l##h0\H#OJ##QJ##^J###$hF#l##h0\  
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J##mH    sH    ## #hF#l##h0\H#OJ##QJ##^J##mH #sH    ####hF#l##h0\  
H#OJ##QJ##^J##aJ###" #hF#l##h0\H#6#0CJ##OJ##QJ##]0^J#####hF#l##h0\  
H#CJ##H*#OJ##QJ##^J#####hF#l##h0\H#CJ##OJ##QJ##^J####j1E###hF#l##h0\  
H#CJ##OJ##QJ##U##^J#####%###%##o%##0%##0%##0  
%##&##&###A&###n&##0#####0#####0#####0#####  
####0#####0#####0#####M##kdyF###$###I f####
```

[illegible]

[illegible]

```
#####0#0#6##0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###0#0####0###030#### 40#
#####a0####0T####&1##'1##02##03##03##03##,4##0#####0#####0#####
####Z#####0#####0#####0#####0#####
#####M##kd
J###$##$If####T###00###0
##+##C          #####C
```

```
#####0#0##6###0####0###00####0###00####0###00####0###030####[]#40#
#####a0###0T####02###02###02###3##"3###3###03###03###03###4##,4##-4##.4##/
4##04##R4##U4##W4##X4##04##04##04##04###5##05##05##05##05###6##V6##^6##z6##06##0
6##06###7###7###7##Z7###a7##p7##u7##07##07##07##07##07##07##07##000000000000δYÉYÉY0
YÉ0ÉÉÉ0ÉÉÉYÉ0#####""hF#l##h0\
H#6#0CJ##0J##QJ##]#0^J###%#hF#l##h0\H#5#0CJ##H*#0J##QJ##\#0^J###%#j0J###hF#l##h0\
H#CJ##0J##QJ##U##^J####hF#l##h0\H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J###!#hF#l##h0\H#5#0H*#0J##QJ##\
#0^J####hF#l##h0\H#6#00J##QJ##]#0^J#####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J##0,4##-4##/
4##07#07##0<##0<##0<##0<##0<#####0#####0#####0#####
###0#####]#####X#####V#####X#####
#####$a$##M##kd0K###$##$#I f#####T###00###0
##+##C#####C
```

```
#####0#0##6###0####0####0####0####0####0####030####[]#40#  
#####a0###0T### 07###07###07###07###8###8###8##!  
8##"8##08##08##08##08##08###9##09##09##09##09###:#6:##;:##Y:##`:##0:##0:###  
;###;###;##0;##0;##0;##0;###<###<###<##7<##:<##a<##b<##0<##0<##0<##0<##0<##0<##0  
<##0<##00p0XpXpC0pC0XC0XX0X0XpX00v#####)jGL###hF#l##h0\  
H#0J##QJ##U##^J##mH #sH ###hF#l##h0\H#>*CJ##0J##QJ##^J##"hF#l##h0\  
H#6#0CJ##0J##QJ##]#0^J####%#hF#l##h0\H#5#0CJ##H*#0J##QJ##\#0^J####hF#l##h0\  
H#CJ##0J##QJ##^J####%#jRK####hF#l##h0\H#CJ##0J##QJ##U##^J####hF#l##h0\  
H#0J##QJ##^J##aJ##10<##0<##0<##0<##0<###=##X==##Y==##0==##>##Q>##R>##~>##[]>##0>##0  
>###?##0?##0?##0?###@###A###zA###{A##~A##0A##0A##0A##B##  
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H#0J##QJ##^J##mH###sH####hF#l##h0\H#0J##QJ##^J##aJ####hF#l##h0\  
H#6#0J##QJ##]#0^J####hF#l##h0\H#5#0J##QJ##\#0^J####hF#l##h0
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themeManager.xml

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#80###00##PK#####!#t]#0###0#####theme/theme/theme1.xml0YKo#7#0#0X
d0##0#0#70#00"GJK000.#000[00z)P -zh00z(0#h0#000#pL?0C0j0000##
[0000f0qf83s0iL0#0#aI0/0*0#N0, I00#000=!Q# 0#00gX0w0?00#}#00#00B?0r000&0000-60
<#1## 0<\#8:#01][0jk1"00%(#0}00#0#0Fd0000#09#)000R03###00
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vwj0Z00#0p#+M00:00J05@0Cw000([xC00#0YxJ0W000n#0h05(0W0000f0m0#_[00K;0J0yA#%0x
]006Z000#00N0f0t0g0##DC#]j0#K0X0010]#(E0\$00M0#!0[00#'0# ##0 J0000z0[
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*[#0h#Q0H#0#K0=cc0#0{B0e0}20L000#0000\$}2000#0%10e0"#00l000k20Zu#00H0#0:00100x#M
%0]*0(0000\\${3>4q#!00!000#X#00!
00#N[]#i000}:0m\$0d0w0#30m6nE(000=0D&0s10#E0#0.0>0w00#?
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0J5;<0R0#'00hNC+00000###{0>w0h00e000#00.v#0}dQ0000nn000##V00p0V◆-
\$0#Jb0Wi>#0060@00]#pH0c#x@0#0xq#0P0##0Wj=00U0hup00[000#0}ylyl'##|
e#H00{m0GQ0#0>0.0nA0r[]!000#0:0F0-0#[]000\$00#Z0}00]0##00#/
#0000;n0V00b00*00.070p0]M00|0MM#M0#

ud9c0047=0000iV00NfU0q0000a0t200ı0d00#0#u0#00c0x0ψP3_00>0#0>#taP003000#N"0Te#&0p
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m#00#^000T000qU_o#.00)S00 0
#000cq]_00bn000)h0600F#Bf0&□#00p#0 v0z0B40o/C00□0020B000R0□
f00H0=Jı0000&:0hn0uH##-0MH+##9p00d<#040n0(K00000\0|0û#V0l
00E070S0#A0U0ee0#0vPN0##0#0'0"0#
S0vQ:00qD'#0*000S0N09#}00000

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0###0###0###0###9###E###Q###V###^###a###v###~###[]###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###  
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%###*###+###3###4###7###8###@###A###H###I###O###T###[###`###g###h###k###l###r###  
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###b###d###g###h###n###o###r###s###y###z###}###~###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###  
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###0###0###0###0###0###0###0########%###'###-  
###.###3###8###>###?  
###H###P###T###Y###_###i###q###u###y###}###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0###0  
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###5###6###7###8###9###:###;###<###=###>###?  
###@###A###B###C###D###E###F###G###H###I###J###K###L###M###N###O###P###Q###R###S  
###T###U###V###W###X###Y###Z###[###\  
###]###^###_###`###a###b###c###d###e###f###g###h###i###j###k###l###m###n###o###p  
###q###r###s###t###u###v###w###x###y###z###{###}  
###}###~###□###①###②###③###④###⑤###⑥###⑦###⑧###⑨###⑩###⑪###⑫###⑬###⑭###⑮###⑯###  
###⑰###⑱###⑲###⑳###㉑###㉒###㉓###㉔###㉕###㉖###㉗###㉘###㉙###㉚###㉛###㉜###㉝###  
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[illegible]

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###MSWordDoc####Word.Document.8#090q#####
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